Termination of Price Wars: A Signaling Approach
Autor Michael Bungerten Limba Engleză Paperback – 26 noi 2003
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9783824479566
ISBN-10: 3824479567
Pagini: 268
Ilustrații: XXIV, 240 p. 1 illus.
Dimensiuni: 148 x 210 x 14 mm
Greutate: 0.32 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2003
Editura: Deutscher Universitätsverlag
Colecția Deutscher Universitätsverlag
Locul publicării:Wiesbaden, Germany
ISBN-10: 3824479567
Pagini: 268
Ilustrații: XXIV, 240 p. 1 illus.
Dimensiuni: 148 x 210 x 14 mm
Greutate: 0.32 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2003
Editura: Deutscher Universitätsverlag
Colecția Deutscher Universitätsverlag
Locul publicării:Wiesbaden, Germany
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
1. Introduction.- 1.1 Background of the Research Problem.- 1.2 Scientific Contribution, Focus and Particularities of the Analysis.- 1.3 Course of the Analysis.- 2. Basic Aspects of Price Wars.- 2.1 Definition Approaches of the Term ‘Price War’.- 2.2 General Factors Leading to Price Wars.- 2.3 The Termination of Price Wars, and Rationales for their Termination.- 2.4 Price War Dynamics: Empiric Findings and a Phase Scheme Suggestion.- 2.5 Other Types of Aggressive Competitive Pricing and Delimitation than Price Wars.- 2.6 Classification Approach and Conclusions on Definitions of Price Wars.- 3. Overview of the Literature on Price Wars.- 3.1 Typology of Price War Related Literature.- 3.2 Literature on Price Wars in Economics.- 3.3 Price Wars in the Marketing and Business Literature.- 3.4 Conclusions on Literature on Price War.- 4. General Approaches to Conflict Analysis and Termination.- 4.1. Relevant Aspects for Price Wars and their Termination from Game Theory and Economics.- 4.2 Basic Concepts of Signals and Signaling.- 4.3 Approaches to Conflict Resolution from other Social Sciences.- 5. A Signaling Approach to Price War Termination, and Hypotheses on Price War Termination Moves and Termination-Relevant Signals.- 5.1 Signaling as an Approach to Terminate Price Wars.- 5.2 Hypotheses on Moves and Interpretations concerning their Potential to Induce Co-operation.- 5.3 Hypotheses on the Impact of Other Types of Interpretations.- 6. Methods of Data Collection and Analysis for the Price War Termination Experiment.- 6.1 Basics on Experimental Design and Interaction Analysis.- 6.2 Experimental Method and Data Collection.- 6.3 Basics on Regression and Logistic Regression Data Analysis Procedures.- 6.4 Logistic Regression Models of the Hypothesized Relations.- 6.5 Frameworkof Hypothesized Relations.- 7. Results of the Signaling Experiment on Price War Termination.- 7.1 Some Descriptive Statistics on Subject Responses.- 7.2 Experimental Results of the Mediation Role of Signals on the Effects of Moves on Competitor Reaction.- 7.3 Experimental Results on the Moderation Effects of Impressions.- 7.4 The Matching of Marketing Moves as Enhancer of the Chance for a Co-operative Price Increase.- 7.5 The Reactions of Non-cooperative Subjects: A Closer Look.- 7.6 Discussion of the Concept and the Results of the Signaling Experiment on Price War Termination.- 8. Research and Managerial Implications.- 8.1 Research Implications.- 8.2 Managerial Implications.- List of Appendices.
Notă biografică
Prof. Dr. Michael Bungert promovierte bei Prof. Dr. Oliver P. Heil am Lehrstuhl für Marketing an der Universität Mainz. Er ist Professor und Referent für Internationale Hochschulkontakte an der Berufsakademie Villingen-Schwenningen.
Textul de pe ultima copertă
Price competition frequently degenerates into its most devastating form: a price war. As the general consensus is that price wars substantially damage the firms involved a new approach is necessary to put an end to these conflicts.
Michael Bungert investigates the possibility to terminate (non-beneficial) price wars through appropriate signals. In an experiment, he analyzes the effect of different types of signals such as switch-blocking intent, reciprocity, co-operation, weakness, and hostility on the price reaction behaviour of a competitor. The author shows the consequences of marketing moves such as individual refunding guarantees, coupons, image advertising, price-matching guarantees, verbal statements and unilateral price increase for the generation of the mentioned signals. He demonstrates that all signal types show a considerable effect on the probability of a co-operative price reaction.
Michael Bungert investigates the possibility to terminate (non-beneficial) price wars through appropriate signals. In an experiment, he analyzes the effect of different types of signals such as switch-blocking intent, reciprocity, co-operation, weakness, and hostility on the price reaction behaviour of a competitor. The author shows the consequences of marketing moves such as individual refunding guarantees, coupons, image advertising, price-matching guarantees, verbal statements and unilateral price increase for the generation of the mentioned signals. He demonstrates that all signal types show a considerable effect on the probability of a co-operative price reaction.