The Agency and the Hill: CIA's Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004
Autor L. Britt Snider Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)en Limba Engleză Paperback – 6 mai 2008 – vârsta de la 22 până la 95 ani
This is a study of the CIA’s relationship with Congress.
It encompasses the period from the creation of the
Agency until 2004—the era of the DCIs. DCIs were Directors of Central Intelligence.
It encompasses the period from the creation of the
Agency until 2004—the era of the DCIs. DCIs were Directors of Central Intelligence.
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9781929667178
ISBN-10: 1929667175
Pagini: 389
Ilustrații: Black and white portraits
Dimensiuni: 152 x 226 x 23 mm
Greutate: 0.75 kg
Ediția:New.
Editura: Central Intelligence Agency
Colecția Central Intelligence Agency
ISBN-10: 1929667175
Pagini: 389
Ilustrații: Black and white portraits
Dimensiuni: 152 x 226 x 23 mm
Greutate: 0.75 kg
Ediția:New.
Editura: Central Intelligence Agency
Colecția Central Intelligence Agency
Cuprins
v
C
ONTENTS Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiii
PART I: WHAT THE RELATIONSHIP WAS LIKE
Chapter 1: THE NATURE OF THE
RELATIONSHIP, 1946–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Central Intelligence Group (1946–47) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Early Oversight Arrangements: 1947–56 . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Mansfield Resolutions: 1953–55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Debate in the Senate: 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Subsequent Developments: 1956–59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
The Issue of GAO Audits: 1959–62 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Shootdown of the U-2: 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Bay of Pigs: 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Remainder of the 1960s: A Period of Quiescence . . . . 23
McCone’s Early Interaction with the Congress . . . . . . . . . . 23
CIA Interaction with the Congress: 1963–66 . . . . . . . . . . . 25
The SFRC Asserts Its Right to Oversee the CIA: 1966 . . . 26
1971: A Pivotal Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Congressional Inquiries into Watergate: 1973–74 . . . . . . . . 28
Congressional Inquiries into the CIA
Activities in Chile: 1973–74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Allegations of Domestic Spying and Other
Abuses: 1974–75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
The Church Committee: 1975–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
The Nedzi/Pike Committees: 1975–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY
The Early Congressional Arrangements: 1947–76 . . . . . . 39
The Joint Committee “Panacea” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
The Personalities, Attitudes, and Circumstances
of the Early DCIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
CHAPTER 2: THE RELATIONSHIP: 1976–2004 . . . . . . . . . 51
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: 1976 . . . . . . 51
The House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence: 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 vi
C
ONTENTS 1977–80: The Committees Prove Themselves . . . . . . . . . . . 56
The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
The Mining of the Nicaraguan Harbors and
the Casey Accords: 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Term Limits as an Issue for the SSCI: 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
GAO Again: 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Continued Wrangling over Covert
Action Notification: 1985–86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Tightening Control over Intelligence Funding: 1986 . . . . . . 63
Investigating the Iran-contra Affair: 1986–87 . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Changes to Congressional Oversight
Prompted by Iran-contra: 1987–91 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
GAO Audits Resurface: 1987–88 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
The Creation of a Statutory Inspector
General for the CIA: 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Statutory Recognition of the Agency’s
Support of Congress: 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Formalization of Notification Procedures:
The Guatemala Inquiries, 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Procedures for “Whistleblowers” Who Wished
to Contact Congress: 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
The Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 Attacks: 2001–2003 . . . . . . 73
Criticism from the 9/11 Commission and an
End to Term Limits: 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
What Changed When the Select Committees Were Created 75
The Joint Committee Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Term Limits for Members of the Select Committees . . . . 77
The Impact of Personalities, Attitudes,
and Circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
CHAPTER 3: INTELLIGENCE-SHARING AND
OTHER INTERACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
The Early Period: 1947–75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
After the Creation of the Select Committees: 1976-2004 . 114
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Significance of the Incidental Interaction with Congress 120
Why Congress Needs Intelligence Support . . . . . . . . . . . 121
The Impact of Intelligence-Sharing with the Congress . . 122
vii
C
ONTENTS CHAPTER 4: ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
AT THE CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
One-Man Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
An Expanded Office of Legislative Counsel: 1976–81 . . 127
Casey and Congress: 1981–86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Responding to Iran-Contra: 1986–90 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Strengthening Ties to the Hill after
the Guatemala Episode: 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
The Office of Congressional Affairs: 1988–2004 . . . . . . . 131
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
The Agency’s Arrangements for Dealing
with the Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
PART II: WHAT THE RELATIONSHIP PRODUCED
CHAPTER 5: LEGISLATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
The Agency’s Original Charter: Section 202
of the National Security Act of 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
The CIA Act of 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Additional Legislation: 1949–64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 . . . . . . 143
The Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980 . . . . . 145
The Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 . . . . . . 145
Exemption from the Freedom of
Information Act for CIA: 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
The CIA Inspector General Act of 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
The Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992 . . . . . . . . . . 149
Naming of the Headquarters Compound: 1998 . . . . . . . . . 150
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Legislating Missions and Authorities for the CIA . . . . . . . 153
The President and Intelligence Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
What Never Made It Through the Congressional Mill . . . 157
CHAPTER 6: PROGRAM AND BUDGET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
The Transition from CIG to CIA: 1946–47 . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Covert Action: Funding a New Mission for the Agency . . 161
viii
C
ONTENTS Interaction in the Early Years: 1948–52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Interaction during the Eisenhower Years: 1953–60 . . . . . . 165
The Agency Headquarters Building: 1951–56 . . . . . . . . . . 170
Developments in the 1960s and Early 1970s . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Consideration of the Budget Process by
the Church and Pike Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Budget Oversight by the Select Committees
on Intelligence: 1977–81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Interaction During the Reagan
Administration: 1981–89 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
The End of the Cold War and Its Effect
on the Budget: 1989–95 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Return to Relative Stability and Modest
Increases: 1995–2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
The Impact of the 9/11
Attacks: 2001–2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Exercising Power of the Purse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Hiding within the Defense Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
The Quality of Budget Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
The Impact of Budget Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
CHAPTER 7: OVERSIGHT OF ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
The Early Years: 1947–74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
The Church and Pike Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Early Interaction with the Select Committees: 1976–80 . . 201
Later Interaction Regarding Analytical Issues: 1980–90 . . 204
The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and the
Persian Gulf War: 1990–91 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
The Gates Confirmation Hearings: 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Interaction with the Select
Committees 1991– 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
The Nature of the Interaction over Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 220
The Implications of Sharing Intelligence
for Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
ix
C
ONTENTS CHAPTER 8: OVERSIGHT OF COLLECTION . . . . . . . . . 223
Early Congressional Awareness of Espionage
Operations: 1947–60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Early Technical Collection: The U-2
and CORONA Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
The Cuban Missile Crisis: 1962–63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Contact with Respect to the Nosenko Case: 1967 . . . . . . . 231
Helms and the Leaders of the CIA
Subcommittees: 1966–73 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
The Church Committee’s Investigation of CIA
Domestic Activities: 1975–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
The Church Committee’s Look at Liaison
Relationships: 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
The Pike Committee’s Treatment of
Operational Issues: 1975–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
Early Involvement of the SSCI in
Operational Matters: 1976–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
Early HPSCI Involvement in
Operational Matters: 1977–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
Executive Order 12333 and Limits on
Domestic Activities: 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
SSCI Inquiry into “Death Squads” in
El Salvador: 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
HPSCI Inquiry into Cuban Operations: 1987 . . . . . . . . . . 241
HPSCI Inquiry into the Agency’s
Relationship with Manuel Noriega: 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
The SSCI’s Consideration of Arms
Control Treaties: 1987–92 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
The SSCI’s Reviews of CIA Support to
Military Operations: 1990–91 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
The SSCI’s Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
Investigation: 1992–93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
The Guatemala Inquiries and their
Aftermath: 1995–96 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
CIA Use of Journalists, Clergy, and
Peace Corps Volunteers: 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Alleged Involvement in Crack Cocaine
Sales in Los Angeles: 1996–2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
CIA’s Role in the Accidental Bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade: 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
SSCI Inquiry into the Shootdown of a
x
C
ONTENTS Civilian Aircraft in Peru: 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Operational Issues in the Joint Report on 9/11: 2002 . . . . 248
Inquiries into Counterterrorism Activities: 2003–04 . . . . . 250
Operational Issues in the SSCI’s Inquiry into
the Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq: 2004 . . . . . 250
HPSCI Criticism of the DO: 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Collection in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Congress and Espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Congress and the Agency’s Technical Collection . . . . . . 255
Chapter 9: OVERSIGHT OF COVERT ACTION . . . . . . . . . 259
Congressional Awareness and Involvement from
1948 until the Bay of Pigs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
The Bay of Pigs: 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
The Ramparts Affair: 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
The “Secret War” in Laos: 1962–71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Chile and the Hughes-Ryan Amendment: 1973–74 . . . . . . 271
Angola: 1975–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
The Church Committee and Alleged
Assassination Plots: 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
Other Covert Action Investigated by
the Church Committee: 1975–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
Covert Action and the Pike Committee: 1975–76 . . . . . . . 278
The Select Committees and How “Findings”
Were Handled: 1976–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
Initial Oversight Efforts of the
Committees: 1977–79 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
The Iranian Rescue Operations: 1979–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
Afghanistan: 1979–87 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Angola and South Africa: 1985–88 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
Central America: 1979–86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
The Investigation of CIA’s Involvement
in the Iran-contra Affair: 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Noriega and the SSCI: 1988–89 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Iranian Arms Shipments to Bosnia: 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
The Gingrich “Add” for Covert Action in Iran: 1995 . . . . 302
Support for the INC and the Iraq
Liberation Act of 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
Covert Action in the Joint Report on 9/11: 2002 . . . . . . . . 304
xi
C
ONTENTS AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
Why Congress Paid Little Attention At First . . . . . . . . . . 305
The Issues Covert Action Raises for Congress . . . . . . . . 306
“Overt” Covert Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
Covert Action Since the End of the Cold War . . . . . . . . . 309
The Impact of the Select Committees’ Oversight
of Covert Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
Chapter 10: OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY AND
PERSONNEL MATTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
The Confrontations with Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy: 1950–54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
The Paisley Matter: 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Max Hugel and the SSCI’s Investigation of
DCI Casey’s Prior Business Dealings: 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Casey’s Emphasis on Counterintelligence
and Security Issues: 1981–84 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
The “Year of the Spy” and Its Aftermath: 1985–87 . . . . . . 318
Concerns over Embassy Security: 1985–88 . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
Providing Authority to Redress Past Injustices: 1988 . . . . 322
The HPSCI’s Inquiry into Sex
Discrimination: 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
The Congressional Reaction to the
Aldrich Ames case: 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
The Mishandling of Classified Information
by Former DCI Deutch: 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
HPSCI Action on Proposed
Compensation Reform: 2003–04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
The Threat and Reality of Espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
Personnel Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
Chapter 11: THE SENATE CONFIRMATION PROCESS . . 331
The Early DCIs: Souers through Dulles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
John McCone: 1962 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
William F. Raborn: 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
Richard M. Helms: 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
James R. Schlesinger: 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
William E. Colby: 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
xii
C
ONTENTS George H.W. Bush: 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
President Carter’s Appointments: Sorensen and Turner . . 338
William J. Casey: 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
The First Gates Nomination: 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
William H. Webster: 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
The Second Gates Nomination: 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
President Clinton’s Choices: Woolsey, Carns,
Deutch, Lake, and Tenet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
Porter Goss: 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
Openness of the Confirmation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
Significance of the Confirmation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
The Ideal Nominee? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A. Directors of Central Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . 353
APPENDIX B. Committee Chairmen with Responsibility
for the CIA (1947–2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
Senate Armed Services Committee (1947–75) . . . . . . . . . 354
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (1976–2004) . . . 354
Senate Appropriations Committee (1947–2004) . . . . . . . . 355
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on
Defense (1975–2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
House Armed Services Committee (1947–1977) . . . . . . . . 356
House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence (1977–2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
House Appropriations Committee (1947–2004) . . . . . . . . 356
APPENDIX C. Heads of the CIA Office of
Congressional Affairs (1947–2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
APPENDIX D. List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Public Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
Oral History Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
Other Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
Books, Articles and Unpublished Manuscripts . . . . . . . . . 365
INDEX
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
C
ONTENTS Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiii
PART I: WHAT THE RELATIONSHIP WAS LIKE
Chapter 1: THE NATURE OF THE
RELATIONSHIP, 1946–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Central Intelligence Group (1946–47) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Early Oversight Arrangements: 1947–56 . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Mansfield Resolutions: 1953–55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Debate in the Senate: 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Subsequent Developments: 1956–59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
The Issue of GAO Audits: 1959–62 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Shootdown of the U-2: 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Bay of Pigs: 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Remainder of the 1960s: A Period of Quiescence . . . . 23
McCone’s Early Interaction with the Congress . . . . . . . . . . 23
CIA Interaction with the Congress: 1963–66 . . . . . . . . . . . 25
The SFRC Asserts Its Right to Oversee the CIA: 1966 . . . 26
1971: A Pivotal Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Congressional Inquiries into Watergate: 1973–74 . . . . . . . . 28
Congressional Inquiries into the CIA
Activities in Chile: 1973–74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Allegations of Domestic Spying and Other
Abuses: 1974–75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
The Church Committee: 1975–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
The Nedzi/Pike Committees: 1975–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY
The Early Congressional Arrangements: 1947–76 . . . . . . 39
The Joint Committee “Panacea” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
The Personalities, Attitudes, and Circumstances
of the Early DCIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
CHAPTER 2: THE RELATIONSHIP: 1976–2004 . . . . . . . . . 51
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: 1976 . . . . . . 51
The House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence: 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 vi
C
ONTENTS 1977–80: The Committees Prove Themselves . . . . . . . . . . . 56
The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
The Mining of the Nicaraguan Harbors and
the Casey Accords: 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Term Limits as an Issue for the SSCI: 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
GAO Again: 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Continued Wrangling over Covert
Action Notification: 1985–86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Tightening Control over Intelligence Funding: 1986 . . . . . . 63
Investigating the Iran-contra Affair: 1986–87 . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Changes to Congressional Oversight
Prompted by Iran-contra: 1987–91 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
GAO Audits Resurface: 1987–88 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
The Creation of a Statutory Inspector
General for the CIA: 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Statutory Recognition of the Agency’s
Support of Congress: 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Formalization of Notification Procedures:
The Guatemala Inquiries, 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Procedures for “Whistleblowers” Who Wished
to Contact Congress: 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
The Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 Attacks: 2001–2003 . . . . . . 73
Criticism from the 9/11 Commission and an
End to Term Limits: 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
What Changed When the Select Committees Were Created 75
The Joint Committee Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Term Limits for Members of the Select Committees . . . . 77
The Impact of Personalities, Attitudes,
and Circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
CHAPTER 3: INTELLIGENCE-SHARING AND
OTHER INTERACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
The Early Period: 1947–75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
After the Creation of the Select Committees: 1976-2004 . 114
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Significance of the Incidental Interaction with Congress 120
Why Congress Needs Intelligence Support . . . . . . . . . . . 121
The Impact of Intelligence-Sharing with the Congress . . 122
vii
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ONTENTS CHAPTER 4: ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
AT THE CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
One-Man Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
An Expanded Office of Legislative Counsel: 1976–81 . . 127
Casey and Congress: 1981–86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Responding to Iran-Contra: 1986–90 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Strengthening Ties to the Hill after
the Guatemala Episode: 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
The Office of Congressional Affairs: 1988–2004 . . . . . . . 131
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
The Agency’s Arrangements for Dealing
with the Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
PART II: WHAT THE RELATIONSHIP PRODUCED
CHAPTER 5: LEGISLATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
The Agency’s Original Charter: Section 202
of the National Security Act of 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
The CIA Act of 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Additional Legislation: 1949–64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 . . . . . . 143
The Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980 . . . . . 145
The Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 . . . . . . 145
Exemption from the Freedom of
Information Act for CIA: 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
The CIA Inspector General Act of 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
The Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992 . . . . . . . . . . 149
Naming of the Headquarters Compound: 1998 . . . . . . . . . 150
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Legislating Missions and Authorities for the CIA . . . . . . . 153
The President and Intelligence Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
What Never Made It Through the Congressional Mill . . . 157
CHAPTER 6: PROGRAM AND BUDGET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
The Transition from CIG to CIA: 1946–47 . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Covert Action: Funding a New Mission for the Agency . . 161
viii
C
ONTENTS Interaction in the Early Years: 1948–52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Interaction during the Eisenhower Years: 1953–60 . . . . . . 165
The Agency Headquarters Building: 1951–56 . . . . . . . . . . 170
Developments in the 1960s and Early 1970s . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Consideration of the Budget Process by
the Church and Pike Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Budget Oversight by the Select Committees
on Intelligence: 1977–81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Interaction During the Reagan
Administration: 1981–89 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
The End of the Cold War and Its Effect
on the Budget: 1989–95 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Return to Relative Stability and Modest
Increases: 1995–2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
The Impact of the 9/11
Attacks: 2001–2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Exercising Power of the Purse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Hiding within the Defense Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
The Quality of Budget Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
The Impact of Budget Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
CHAPTER 7: OVERSIGHT OF ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
The Early Years: 1947–74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
The Church and Pike Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Early Interaction with the Select Committees: 1976–80 . . 201
Later Interaction Regarding Analytical Issues: 1980–90 . . 204
The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and the
Persian Gulf War: 1990–91 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
The Gates Confirmation Hearings: 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Interaction with the Select
Committees 1991– 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
The Nature of the Interaction over Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 220
The Implications of Sharing Intelligence
for Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
ix
C
ONTENTS CHAPTER 8: OVERSIGHT OF COLLECTION . . . . . . . . . 223
Early Congressional Awareness of Espionage
Operations: 1947–60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Early Technical Collection: The U-2
and CORONA Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
The Cuban Missile Crisis: 1962–63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Contact with Respect to the Nosenko Case: 1967 . . . . . . . 231
Helms and the Leaders of the CIA
Subcommittees: 1966–73 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
The Church Committee’s Investigation of CIA
Domestic Activities: 1975–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
The Church Committee’s Look at Liaison
Relationships: 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
The Pike Committee’s Treatment of
Operational Issues: 1975–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
Early Involvement of the SSCI in
Operational Matters: 1976–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
Early HPSCI Involvement in
Operational Matters: 1977–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
Executive Order 12333 and Limits on
Domestic Activities: 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
SSCI Inquiry into “Death Squads” in
El Salvador: 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
HPSCI Inquiry into Cuban Operations: 1987 . . . . . . . . . . 241
HPSCI Inquiry into the Agency’s
Relationship with Manuel Noriega: 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
The SSCI’s Consideration of Arms
Control Treaties: 1987–92 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
The SSCI’s Reviews of CIA Support to
Military Operations: 1990–91 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
The SSCI’s Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
Investigation: 1992–93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
The Guatemala Inquiries and their
Aftermath: 1995–96 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
CIA Use of Journalists, Clergy, and
Peace Corps Volunteers: 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Alleged Involvement in Crack Cocaine
Sales in Los Angeles: 1996–2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
CIA’s Role in the Accidental Bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade: 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
SSCI Inquiry into the Shootdown of a
x
C
ONTENTS Civilian Aircraft in Peru: 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Operational Issues in the Joint Report on 9/11: 2002 . . . . 248
Inquiries into Counterterrorism Activities: 2003–04 . . . . . 250
Operational Issues in the SSCI’s Inquiry into
the Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq: 2004 . . . . . 250
HPSCI Criticism of the DO: 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Collection in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Congress and Espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Congress and the Agency’s Technical Collection . . . . . . 255
Chapter 9: OVERSIGHT OF COVERT ACTION . . . . . . . . . 259
Congressional Awareness and Involvement from
1948 until the Bay of Pigs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
The Bay of Pigs: 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
The Ramparts Affair: 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
The “Secret War” in Laos: 1962–71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Chile and the Hughes-Ryan Amendment: 1973–74 . . . . . . 271
Angola: 1975–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
The Church Committee and Alleged
Assassination Plots: 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
Other Covert Action Investigated by
the Church Committee: 1975–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
Covert Action and the Pike Committee: 1975–76 . . . . . . . 278
The Select Committees and How “Findings”
Were Handled: 1976–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
Initial Oversight Efforts of the
Committees: 1977–79 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
The Iranian Rescue Operations: 1979–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
Afghanistan: 1979–87 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Angola and South Africa: 1985–88 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
Central America: 1979–86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
The Investigation of CIA’s Involvement
in the Iran-contra Affair: 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Noriega and the SSCI: 1988–89 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Iranian Arms Shipments to Bosnia: 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
The Gingrich “Add” for Covert Action in Iran: 1995 . . . . 302
Support for the INC and the Iraq
Liberation Act of 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
Covert Action in the Joint Report on 9/11: 2002 . . . . . . . . 304
xi
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ONTENTS AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
Why Congress Paid Little Attention At First . . . . . . . . . . 305
The Issues Covert Action Raises for Congress . . . . . . . . 306
“Overt” Covert Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
Covert Action Since the End of the Cold War . . . . . . . . . 309
The Impact of the Select Committees’ Oversight
of Covert Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
Chapter 10: OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY AND
PERSONNEL MATTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
The Confrontations with Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy: 1950–54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
The Paisley Matter: 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Max Hugel and the SSCI’s Investigation of
DCI Casey’s Prior Business Dealings: 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Casey’s Emphasis on Counterintelligence
and Security Issues: 1981–84 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
The “Year of the Spy” and Its Aftermath: 1985–87 . . . . . . 318
Concerns over Embassy Security: 1985–88 . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
Providing Authority to Redress Past Injustices: 1988 . . . . 322
The HPSCI’s Inquiry into Sex
Discrimination: 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
The Congressional Reaction to the
Aldrich Ames case: 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
The Mishandling of Classified Information
by Former DCI Deutch: 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
HPSCI Action on Proposed
Compensation Reform: 2003–04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
The Threat and Reality of Espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
Personnel Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
Chapter 11: THE SENATE CONFIRMATION PROCESS . . 331
The Early DCIs: Souers through Dulles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
John McCone: 1962 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
William F. Raborn: 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
Richard M. Helms: 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
James R. Schlesinger: 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
William E. Colby: 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
xii
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ONTENTS George H.W. Bush: 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
President Carter’s Appointments: Sorensen and Turner . . 338
William J. Casey: 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
The First Gates Nomination: 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
William H. Webster: 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
The Second Gates Nomination: 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
President Clinton’s Choices: Woolsey, Carns,
Deutch, Lake, and Tenet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
Porter Goss: 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
Openness of the Confirmation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
Significance of the Confirmation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
The Ideal Nominee? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A. Directors of Central Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . 353
APPENDIX B. Committee Chairmen with Responsibility
for the CIA (1947–2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
Senate Armed Services Committee (1947–75) . . . . . . . . . 354
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (1976–2004) . . . 354
Senate Appropriations Committee (1947–2004) . . . . . . . . 355
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on
Defense (1975–2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
House Armed Services Committee (1947–1977) . . . . . . . . 356
House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence (1977–2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
House Appropriations Committee (1947–2004) . . . . . . . . 356
APPENDIX C. Heads of the CIA Office of
Congressional Affairs (1947–2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
APPENDIX D. List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Public Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
Oral History Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
Other Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
Books, Articles and Unpublished Manuscripts . . . . . . . . . 365
INDEX
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
Recenzii
Library Journal 5/15/2009 issue; Special Feature Article by Jim Church "Looking Back, Moving On: 2008 Best Notable Government Documents"
The Agency and the Hill: CIA's Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004. by L. Britt Snider. Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS101665. 2008. 389p. photos. SuDoc # PREX 3.17:AG 3. GPO Stock # 041-015-00257-1 $49.
"This detailed study encompasses the period from the creation of the agency in 1947 until 2004, when the director of Central Intelligence ceased being the head of the U.S. intelligence community. The aim was to offer an understanding of the agency's relationship with Congress, analyze the past, and provide a guide to the future."
The Agency and the Hill: CIA's Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004. by L. Britt Snider. Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS101665. 2008. 389p. photos. SuDoc # PREX 3.17:AG 3. GPO Stock # 041-015-00257-1 $49.
"This detailed study encompasses the period from the creation of the agency in 1947 until 2004, when the director of Central Intelligence ceased being the head of the U.S. intelligence community. The aim was to offer an understanding of the agency's relationship with Congress, analyze the past, and provide a guide to the future."
Comentariile autorului
PREFACE
This is a study of the CIA’s relationship with Congress. It encompasses the
period from the creation of the Agency until 2004—the era of the DCIs. When
Congress created a new position in December 2004—the director of national
intelligence—to supersede the director of central intelligence (DCI) as head of
the US Intelligence Community, it necessarily changed the dynamic between
the CIA and the Congress. While the director of the Agency would continue to
represent its interests on Capitol Hill, he or she would no longer speak as the
head of US intelligence. While 2008 is too early to assess how this change
will affect the Agency’s relationship with Congress, it is safe to say it will
never be quite the same.
This study is not organized as one might expect. It does not describe what
occurred between the Agency and Congress in chronological order nor does it
purport to describe every interaction that occurred over the period encompassed
by the study. Rather it attempts to describe what the relationship was
like over time and then look at what it produced in seven discrete areas.
I took this approach for several reasons. First, I found that telling the story
in chronological sequence tended to obscure the lessons of the past, rather
than illuminate them. Taking everything at once and bringing it forward made
it more difficult to discern what was happening. The forest obscured the trees,
if you will. Moreover, not everything that transpired in the course of the relationship
can be considered historically significant. Even if it were possible to
recount every interaction that took place between the Agency and Congress
over the 58-year period covered by this study (and it isn’t), readers would be
wasting their time delving into it.
“Slicing and dicing” the subject matter in this way, however, did inevitably
lead to a degree of duplication. I tried to deal with this problem by limiting the
explanatory material in each chapter to that which was necessary to understanding
the points being made in that chapter, even if the same explanatory
material were also needed (to a lesser or greater extent) to understand the
points being made in other chapters. Hopefully, the reader will bear this in
mind (and remain tolerant) where the duplication occurs.
An element of subjectivity was also involved in choosing the examples
used in the study. Several factors influenced my choices here. First, I wanted
to confine myself to episodes that were historically significant and/or would
best highlight the issues identified. I also chose episodes, where possible, that
had some prior public context. Without it, not only would more explanation be
required, but the chances of having it declassified would be practically nil. My
intent was to produce an unclassified study, something that could be read by
Agency employees outside the office. Readers may be surprised to learn that
this created less of a problem than one might expect, since most of the significant
interaction that has occurred between Congress and the Agency involves
matters that have previously been disclosed in some manner.
The reader should not expect to find, however, detailed descriptions of the
episodes chosen for the narrative. In order to keep the study to a manageable
length, I deliberately tried to distill the descriptions of the events I chose into
readable summaries. What I am principally concerned with here is the congressional
involvement in these episodes, not with what the Agency did or did
not do that prompted Congress to become involved. Indeed, books have been
written about many of the episodes described here. I am not attempting to replicate
what is already in the public domain with respect to the Agency’s past,
but rather to describe how the Agency engaged with Congress with respect to
its past. Readers who want more detail concerning the Agency’s activities
alluded to in the study will need to consult other sources.
The study is divided into two major parts.
Part I describes how Congress and the Agency related to each other over the
period covered by the study. As it happens, this period conveniently breaks
down into two major segments: the years before the creation of the select
committees on intelligence (1946–76) and the years after the creation of these
committees (1976–2004). The arrangements that Congress put in place during
the earlier period to provide oversight and tend to the needs of the Agency
were distinctly different from those put in place in the mid-1970s and beyond.
Over the entire period, moreover, the Agency shared intelligence with the
Congress and had other interaction with its members that affected the relationship.
This, too, is described in part I.
Part II describes what the relationship produced over time in seven discrete
areas: legislation affecting the Agency; programs and budget; oversight of
analysis; oversight of collection; oversight of covert action; oversight of security
and personnel matters; and the Senate confirmation process. It highlights
what the principal issues have been for Congress in each area as well as how
those issues have been handled.
My principal objective in undertaking this study was not so much to describe
as to explain—to write something that would help CIA employees better
understand the Agency’s relationship with Congress, not only to help them
appreciate the past but to provide a guide to the future. At the end of each chapter
appears a section titled “Author’s Commentary” that contains my observations
with respect to the topics covered in that chapter. The opinions expressed
here are solely mine and should not be seen as necessarily reflecting the views
of the Center for the Study of Intelligence or the Central Intelligence Agency.
In preparing this study, I have had access to classified Agency records.
Within this body of material, the research done in the early 1990s by former
Agency historian Gerald K. Haines proved especially useful. Classified monographs
and interviews prepared by the Center for the Study of Intelligence
were also unusually helpful. Inasmuch as this is an unclassified study, however,
with a few exceptions only unclassified materials are cited in the footnotes.
Where classified sources are involved, I typically refer to them in the
text as “Agency records” or, in some cases, omit any source identification at
all. While I recognize that from a reader’s standpoint this may be far from
ideal, it was necessary to keep the study at an unclassified level.
While these documents were extremely useful, I was also struck by the relative
paucity of documentation available at the CIA concerning its relations with
Congress before the mid-1970s, testament in and of itself to the informal,
highly personal nature of the relationship during that period. Information was
routinely communicated by DCIs to members of Congress without anyone else
being present. As such, there was no one to memorialize for the Agency’s
records what had been said. Even where memos were prepared, they were often
so cursory it was impossible to know what had actually been communicated.
In addition to the classified materials, numerous public sources were consulted.
Two books have thus far been written on the subject of congressional
oversight of intelligence, and both are cited frequently in this study: Smist’s
Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community and Barrett’s
The CIA and Congress. Indeed, both provide information that is not otherwise
found in the Agency’s files. Numerous other books reviewed by the author
have dealt with aspects of the CIA’s relations with Congress. The most notable
of these are Woodward’s Veil; Prados’s Lost Crusader and Presidents’ Secret
Wars; and Ranelagh’s The Agency. Several former DCIs have written memoirs
that have useful insights: Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder; Gates, From the
Shadows; and, most recently, Tenet, At the Center of the Storm.
I also did a limited number of interviews for the study, primarily with CIA
officials who had recently been involved in managing the relationship with
Congress and who had not been previously interviewed by the Center’s historians.
Sadly, these did not include the personal recollections of Stanley M.
Moskowitz, who twice served as the Agency’s liaison with the Congress
under DCIs Woolsey and Tenet. While Stan had agreed to be interviewed for
this project, he passed away unexpectedly on 29 June 2006 before the interview
could be scheduled.
I did not seek access to records held by the select intelligence committees,
given their past reluctance (under their respective committee rules) to provide
such access to outsiders. It is my hope that one day they will see fit to write
their own histories and make them available to the public.
—L. Britt Snider
This is a study of the CIA’s relationship with Congress. It encompasses the
period from the creation of the Agency until 2004—the era of the DCIs. When
Congress created a new position in December 2004—the director of national
intelligence—to supersede the director of central intelligence (DCI) as head of
the US Intelligence Community, it necessarily changed the dynamic between
the CIA and the Congress. While the director of the Agency would continue to
represent its interests on Capitol Hill, he or she would no longer speak as the
head of US intelligence. While 2008 is too early to assess how this change
will affect the Agency’s relationship with Congress, it is safe to say it will
never be quite the same.
This study is not organized as one might expect. It does not describe what
occurred between the Agency and Congress in chronological order nor does it
purport to describe every interaction that occurred over the period encompassed
by the study. Rather it attempts to describe what the relationship was
like over time and then look at what it produced in seven discrete areas.
I took this approach for several reasons. First, I found that telling the story
in chronological sequence tended to obscure the lessons of the past, rather
than illuminate them. Taking everything at once and bringing it forward made
it more difficult to discern what was happening. The forest obscured the trees,
if you will. Moreover, not everything that transpired in the course of the relationship
can be considered historically significant. Even if it were possible to
recount every interaction that took place between the Agency and Congress
over the 58-year period covered by this study (and it isn’t), readers would be
wasting their time delving into it.
“Slicing and dicing” the subject matter in this way, however, did inevitably
lead to a degree of duplication. I tried to deal with this problem by limiting the
explanatory material in each chapter to that which was necessary to understanding
the points being made in that chapter, even if the same explanatory
material were also needed (to a lesser or greater extent) to understand the
points being made in other chapters. Hopefully, the reader will bear this in
mind (and remain tolerant) where the duplication occurs.
An element of subjectivity was also involved in choosing the examples
used in the study. Several factors influenced my choices here. First, I wanted
to confine myself to episodes that were historically significant and/or would
best highlight the issues identified. I also chose episodes, where possible, that
had some prior public context. Without it, not only would more explanation be
required, but the chances of having it declassified would be practically nil. My
intent was to produce an unclassified study, something that could be read by
Agency employees outside the office. Readers may be surprised to learn that
this created less of a problem than one might expect, since most of the significant
interaction that has occurred between Congress and the Agency involves
matters that have previously been disclosed in some manner.
The reader should not expect to find, however, detailed descriptions of the
episodes chosen for the narrative. In order to keep the study to a manageable
length, I deliberately tried to distill the descriptions of the events I chose into
readable summaries. What I am principally concerned with here is the congressional
involvement in these episodes, not with what the Agency did or did
not do that prompted Congress to become involved. Indeed, books have been
written about many of the episodes described here. I am not attempting to replicate
what is already in the public domain with respect to the Agency’s past,
but rather to describe how the Agency engaged with Congress with respect to
its past. Readers who want more detail concerning the Agency’s activities
alluded to in the study will need to consult other sources.
The study is divided into two major parts.
Part I describes how Congress and the Agency related to each other over the
period covered by the study. As it happens, this period conveniently breaks
down into two major segments: the years before the creation of the select
committees on intelligence (1946–76) and the years after the creation of these
committees (1976–2004). The arrangements that Congress put in place during
the earlier period to provide oversight and tend to the needs of the Agency
were distinctly different from those put in place in the mid-1970s and beyond.
Over the entire period, moreover, the Agency shared intelligence with the
Congress and had other interaction with its members that affected the relationship.
This, too, is described in part I.
Part II describes what the relationship produced over time in seven discrete
areas: legislation affecting the Agency; programs and budget; oversight of
analysis; oversight of collection; oversight of covert action; oversight of security
and personnel matters; and the Senate confirmation process. It highlights
what the principal issues have been for Congress in each area as well as how
those issues have been handled.
My principal objective in undertaking this study was not so much to describe
as to explain—to write something that would help CIA employees better
understand the Agency’s relationship with Congress, not only to help them
appreciate the past but to provide a guide to the future. At the end of each chapter
appears a section titled “Author’s Commentary” that contains my observations
with respect to the topics covered in that chapter. The opinions expressed
here are solely mine and should not be seen as necessarily reflecting the views
of the Center for the Study of Intelligence or the Central Intelligence Agency.
In preparing this study, I have had access to classified Agency records.
Within this body of material, the research done in the early 1990s by former
Agency historian Gerald K. Haines proved especially useful. Classified monographs
and interviews prepared by the Center for the Study of Intelligence
were also unusually helpful. Inasmuch as this is an unclassified study, however,
with a few exceptions only unclassified materials are cited in the footnotes.
Where classified sources are involved, I typically refer to them in the
text as “Agency records” or, in some cases, omit any source identification at
all. While I recognize that from a reader’s standpoint this may be far from
ideal, it was necessary to keep the study at an unclassified level.
While these documents were extremely useful, I was also struck by the relative
paucity of documentation available at the CIA concerning its relations with
Congress before the mid-1970s, testament in and of itself to the informal,
highly personal nature of the relationship during that period. Information was
routinely communicated by DCIs to members of Congress without anyone else
being present. As such, there was no one to memorialize for the Agency’s
records what had been said. Even where memos were prepared, they were often
so cursory it was impossible to know what had actually been communicated.
In addition to the classified materials, numerous public sources were consulted.
Two books have thus far been written on the subject of congressional
oversight of intelligence, and both are cited frequently in this study: Smist’s
Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community and Barrett’s
The CIA and Congress. Indeed, both provide information that is not otherwise
found in the Agency’s files. Numerous other books reviewed by the author
have dealt with aspects of the CIA’s relations with Congress. The most notable
of these are Woodward’s Veil; Prados’s Lost Crusader and Presidents’ Secret
Wars; and Ranelagh’s The Agency. Several former DCIs have written memoirs
that have useful insights: Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder; Gates, From the
Shadows; and, most recently, Tenet, At the Center of the Storm.
I also did a limited number of interviews for the study, primarily with CIA
officials who had recently been involved in managing the relationship with
Congress and who had not been previously interviewed by the Center’s historians.
Sadly, these did not include the personal recollections of Stanley M.
Moskowitz, who twice served as the Agency’s liaison with the Congress
under DCIs Woolsey and Tenet. While Stan had agreed to be interviewed for
this project, he passed away unexpectedly on 29 June 2006 before the interview
could be scheduled.
I did not seek access to records held by the select intelligence committees,
given their past reluctance (under their respective committee rules) to provide
such access to outsiders. It is my hope that one day they will see fit to write
their own histories and make them available to the public.
—L. Britt Snider
Extras
Excerpts from The Agency and Hill:
""
"Looking back over the Agency’s early history, it is
remarkable how often the idea of a joint committee on
intelligence was offered up in Congress as the panacea
to the existing oversight arrangements."
"The Agency’s fortunes on Capitol Hill to some degreeThis is a study of the CIA’s relationship with Congress.
It encompasses the period from the creation of the
Agency until 2004—the era of the DCIs.
have always been a function of how the committees
with responsbility for the Agency perceived the DCI:
the greater the level of trust, the greater the level of
comfort in terms of how the Agency is operating. But
especially during the early years, when so much of the
interaction between the Agency and the Congress was
informal and personal, how the DCI was perceived on
the Hill was a key factor in setting the terms of the relationship.""
""
"Looking back over the Agency’s early history, it is
remarkable how often the idea of a joint committee on
intelligence was offered up in Congress as the panacea
to the existing oversight arrangements."
"The Agency’s fortunes on Capitol Hill to some degreeThis is a study of the CIA’s relationship with Congress.
It encompasses the period from the creation of the
Agency until 2004—the era of the DCIs.
have always been a function of how the committees
with responsbility for the Agency perceived the DCI:
the greater the level of trust, the greater the level of
comfort in terms of how the Agency is operating. But
especially during the early years, when so much of the
interaction between the Agency and the Congress was
informal and personal, how the DCI was perceived on
the Hill was a key factor in setting the terms of the relationship.""
Textul de pe ultima copertă
Excerpts from The Agency and Hill:
""
"Looking back over the Agency’s early history, it is
remarkable how often the idea of a joint committee on
intelligence was offered up in Congress as the panacea
to the existing oversight arrangements."
"The Agency’s fortunes on Capitol Hill to some degree this is a study of the CIA’s relationship with Congress.
It encompasses the period from the creation of the
Agency until 2004—the era of the DCIs.
have always been a function of how the committees
with responsbility for the Agency perceived the DCI:
the greater the level of trust, the greater the level of
comfort in terms of how the Agency is operating. But
especially during the early years, when so much of the
interaction between the Agency and the Congress was
informal and personal, how the DCI was perceived on
the Hill was a key factor in setting the terms of the relationship.""
""
"Looking back over the Agency’s early history, it is
remarkable how often the idea of a joint committee on
intelligence was offered up in Congress as the panacea
to the existing oversight arrangements."
"The Agency’s fortunes on Capitol Hill to some degree this is a study of the CIA’s relationship with Congress.
It encompasses the period from the creation of the
Agency until 2004—the era of the DCIs.
have always been a function of how the committees
with responsbility for the Agency perceived the DCI:
the greater the level of trust, the greater the level of
comfort in terms of how the Agency is operating. But
especially during the early years, when so much of the
interaction between the Agency and the Congress was
informal and personal, how the DCI was perceived on
the Hill was a key factor in setting the terms of the relationship.""