In this engaging and meticulously researched volume, John A. Adams reexamines the decisions made by Dwight D. Eisenhower and his staff in the crucial months leading up to the Battle of the Bulge. In late August 1944, Allied tanks chased the remnants of the German army from France, and defeat of the Wehrmacht seemed assured. On December 16, however, German tanks tore into the Americans in the Ardennes and made for the Meuse. Conventional wisdom says that Eisenhower’s Broad Front strategy caused his armies to stall in early September, thus giving the Germans the breather they needed. Ike’s subsequent failure to concentrate his forces in the battles of October and November brought about deadlock and opened the way for the German counterattack. Arguing to the contrary, Adams demonstrates that not only did Eisenhower and his staff at SHAEF have a good campaign strategy that was refined to reflect current developments but that they also had an excellent chance of destroying the Germans west of the Rhine. Adams’s views may be controversial, but his careful attention to the documentary evidence and closely argued strategic analysis are sure to engage the armchair strategist.