A thoroughly documented account of the 1967 guerrilla challenge in Bolivia, this volume reconstructs events leading up to, during, and after the defeat of the insurgency. Against the background of the 1960s' attempt to extend Cuban influence throughout Latin America, the book offers an analysis of trends in Bolivian politics from 1952 to 1967. General Prado then evaluates the geographical setting of the insurgency, guerrilla preparations, and the Bolivian response. Prado identifies key strategic errors, including Che Guevara's failure to capture peasant support, and analyzes Che's own theories. Military historians will find no sensational revelations here but, instead, previously unknown details that form a concise reconstruction of The Defeat of Che Guevara.Recently retired from the Bolivian Army, Prado avoids partisan tones and provides an unusually balanced account of the 1967 guerrilla insurgency in Bolivia. A four-part volume, Part I presents a thorough discussion of the international, national, and military climate. Part II assesses the geographical setting. Part III details operations from preparations to defeat. The volume concludes with a thorough evaluation of the insurgency--causes for its failure, an analysis of Che Guevara's theories, and the Bolivian army's mistakes.