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The Dynamics of Norms: Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory

Editat de Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, Brian Skyrms
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 8 apr 2009
In the social sciences norms are sometimes taken to play a key explanatory role. Yet norms differ from group to group, from society to society, and from species to species. How are norms formed and how do they change? This 'state-of-the-art' collection of essays presents some of the best contemporary research into the dynamic processes underlying the formation, maintenance, metamorphosis and dissolution of norms. The volume combines formal modelling with more traditional analysis, and considers biological and cultural evolution, individual learning, and rational deliberation. In filling a significant gap in the current literature this volume will be of particular interest to economists, political scientists and sociologists, in addition to philosophers of the social sciences.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780521108744
ISBN-10: 0521108748
Pagini: 236
Ilustrații: 16 b/w illus.
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 x 14 mm
Greutate: 0.35 kg
Editura: Cambridge University Press
Colecția Cambridge University Press
Seria Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory

Locul publicării:New York, United States

Cuprins

1. The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma Robert Axelrod; 2. Learning to co-operate Cristina Bicchieri; 3. On the dynamics of social norms Pier Luigi Sacco; 4. Learning and efficiency in common interest signalling games David Canning; 5. Learning on a Torus Luca Anderlini and Antonella Ianni; 6. Evolutive vs. naive Bayesian learning Immanuel M. Bomze and Jurgen Eichberger; 7. Learning and mixed strategy equilibria in evolutionary games Vincent P. Crawford; 8. Bayesian learning in games: a non-Bayesian perspective J. S. Jordan; 9. Savage-Bayesian agents play a repeated game Yaw Nyarko; 10. Chaos and the explanatory significance of equilibrium: strange attractors in evolutionary game theory Brian Skyrms.

Descriere

A 'state-of-the-art' collection of essays, presenting some of the best contemporary research into norms.