What does it mean to act freely? In other words: How can we - practically and epistemologically - specify the ability that rational beings have to make things happen in the world in a way that warrants that they be held responsible? This book suggests a renewed approach to this question, with the purpose of avoiding dualistic consequences. Kant tries to solve the free will problem by defending the possibility of a metaphysical space for freedom outside the realm of nature. Despite its subtleties, his theory remains dualistic. In this book, the problem is approached from a different angle: Rather than starting out (negatively) with an examination of the metaphysical possibility of transcendental freedom, it is argued (positively) that freedom is an analytical component of the concept of action. If we start with the way we actually recognise (our own and others') actions as free, we come to see that it is not a matter of identifying and describing an inner quality, but a matter of mutual recognition and acknowledgement.