Many aspects of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in today's contemporary operating environment suggest historical review of previous COIN experiences can provide critical insight. Such reviews tend to fail to be incorporated into doctrine as time and era change reduced the perceived relevance of previous experiences. Development of COIN doctrine requires a detailed study of available insurgency experiences to enable the U.S. military to apply the crucial principles of COIN to current threat models. An example of an army which struggled to develop COIN doctrine as it combated an insurgency is the French Army in their conflict in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. French experiences in Algeria provide information on COIN operations that achieved great success at the tactical level, but failure at the strategic level. From this perspective, it is important to examine current U.S. Army doctrine, recently published in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in light of French efforts in Algeria. Centered on the influencing a population, French COIN experiences provide examples to compare against current U.S. doctrine.