There is no such thing as "free competition" in the health market. A firm is not allowed to renege on agreements with customers of the rival's site, or compete through conspiracy or tort-interference. The government is relied upon to enforce property rights or contractual arrangements, and the common law rules the limited monopolies such as investment privileges, provision of services, or the patent seats. The traditional emphasis of intellectually vibrant health economy scholarship is built around the questions, what are the policy mechanisms, and how do they operate? The current effort has a quite different orientation. Rather than elucidate the institutional aspects of regulatory policies, we target the economic issues at the stake. What particular health market failures provide a rationale for government intervention? How can economic theory illuminate the character of health market operation, the role for government action and its appropriate form? From the game theories (Cournot and Stackelberg models), description of the stages in healthcare policymaking and regulations, to the pros and cons analysis of the vertical mergers (scale economy) and horizontal consolidations (score economy) of the medical oligopolistic firms, this book has it all. It also presents the author's original studies with empirical reasoning of the highly functional mergers.