After the Gettysburg Campaign of the American Civil War in late July 1863, the Union Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major General George G. Meade, pursued the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by General Robert E. Lee, south into Central Virginia. There followed a series of maneuvers and engagements as the two commanders jockeyed for position. The Mine Run Campaign constitutes one of these episodes and was conducted during the period 20 October 1863 to 2 December 1863. Little study has been devoted to this rather obscure campaign because of its relatively inconclusive results. However, the campaign does provide a unique opportunity to analyze the actions and thought processes of an army commander at the operational level of war. Since the Mine Run Campaign was Meade's first army level offensive operation, this paper is focused on his application of the Operational Art. To that end this study explores the factors that influence the development of the army commander's intent, the design of his campaign plan, and the execution of the campaign in combat operations.