This book investigates whether heavy divisions should employ mounted raids to support tactical deep operations. It proposes that current doctrine and practice focus on aviation and artillery as the means for conducting lethal deep operations because deep ground maneuver operations require extensive logistics "tails" to support them. By focusing on aviation and artillery as their lethal deep operations assets. division commandeers reduce their flexibility. By employing mounted raids. commandeers eliminate the need for a logistics "tall" to follow the ground force, and they gain the flexibility to use the force which can best accomplish the mission. The book first examines the theoretical basis for deep operations using the works of Carl von Clausewitz. J.F.C. Fuller. and B.H. Liddell-Hart. The second section, using criteria developed from the Huba Wass de Czege combat power mode 1, investigates the advantages and disadvantages of raids based upon three historical examples: the raid on Magdhaba in WWI. the raid on Hammelb.Jrg during WWII. and Israel 's Operation Raviv conducted in 1969. Finally, the monograph analyzes current U.S. Army capabilities by comparing and contrasting the combat power potential of the organic artillery, aviation, and ground maneuver assets a division can employ in deep operations.