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The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making, and Deterrence Failure: Praeger Studies in Diplomacy and Strategic Thought

Autor John H. Maurer
en Limba Engleză Hardback – 17 oct 1995 – vârsta până la 17 ani
This study examines what led the leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany to launch major military offensives at the beginning of the First World War. The focus is on understanding why these two countries adopted high-risk offensive strategies during an international confrontation rather than a defensive military stance. The decision to attack or defend did not occur in a political vacuum. The leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany adopted offensive strategies as a way to achieve their political ambitions. The offensives undertaken by Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1914 thus reflected their political goals as well as the strategic doctrines of war planners. The concluding chapter of this study explores why deterrence failed in 1914.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780275949983
ISBN-10: 0275949982
Pagini: 168
Dimensiuni: 156 x 235 x 19 mm
Greutate: 0.45 kg
Ediția:New.
Editura: Bloomsbury Publishing
Colecția Praeger
Seria Praeger Studies in Diplomacy and Strategic Thought

Locul publicării:New York, United States

Notă biografică

JOHN H. MAURER is Associate Professor in the Strategy Department of the U.S. Naval War College where he lectures on naval history and strategy, international history, and strategic studies. He is also the assistant editor of the journal Diplomacy and Statecraft.

Cuprins

AcknowledgmentsAbbreviationsIntroductionWar PlanningThe Short War DogmaAustria-Hungary's War PlansPrewar Military Collaboration between Austria-Hungary and GermanyThe July CrisisA Terrorist Attack in Sarajevo; Austria-Hungary and Germany Decide for WarRussia's Decision for WarVienna and Berlin Order General MobilizationEast or West in Germany's DeploymentBritain's Decision for WarConclusion: Why Deterrence Failed in 1914Appendix I: Austria-Hungary's Mobilization CalendarAppendix II: Tabular Overview of the Movement of the "B"-Staffel in 1914Appendix III: Staabs' Deployment EastBibliographyIndex