Intrastate conflicts, ranging from localized rebellions to civil war, increased linearly from 1946 through 1992 and then dramatically decreased in the post-Cold War era. This rise and fall of subnational conflict closely mirrors the "proxy" wars fought by or between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States. Proxy refers to great power hostility expressed through client states" and describes superpower use of these states to pursue strategic and ideological goals within the confines of nuclear deterrent postures extant during the Cold War. This was done in large part to achieve strategic national interests and other political goals without risking nuclear war. In its waning years, the USSR could no longer afford to fund these wars; America ended support to many of these commitments soon after the Cold War ended. With resources dried up, former client states and subgroups had little choice but to resolve these conflicts, either via negotiation or decisive victory. The United States emerged from the Cold War as the sole superpower in a unipolar international system. However, evidence suggests this unipolarity could soon change as a new bipolar system emerges with China as the next challenger superpower. Scholars debate the likelihood of future war with a rising China, with each side arguing whether direct conflict is inevitable. Yet this debate does not consider what I suggest is the most probable future of United States-China relations; while direct conflict with China is indeed a possibility, it remains remote. I offer a quite different theory, in which subnational conflict will rise once more as the United States engages in proxy conflicts with China over resource access in Africa. These conflicts will place great demands on all US instruments of power, as involvement in counterinsurgency operations in Africa trends upward. Bipolarity and renewed proxy conflict will require rethinking of long-term national and military strategies focused primarily on large-scale interstate wars; this will impact defense acquisition and military doctrine as US strategic focus shifts from conventional conflict to counterinsurgency operations. This paper defines subnational and proxy conflicts and explains why nuclear powers in a bipolar system make strategic policy choices to compete by proxy over contentious issues. It reviews the historical record of subnational proxy conflict conducted by the United States and the USSR from 1946 through the end of the Cold War era. This paper will discuss the rationale for my claim that China will soon be poised to challenge the United States within a new bipolar order, with a concomitant increase of proxy conflicts between the two. It reviews the implications for US grand and military strategies, as well as for defense acquisition programs and development of future doctrine to meet this new order. It concludes by discussing recommendations for strategic planning over the next several decades.