Many historians contend that the U.S. Government's first real experience in countering an insurgency came during the Philippine Insurrection of 1899; and they classify previous conflicts with the American Indians as limited "wars of conquest." In fact, the long struggle between the government and the Apache Indians stemmed from complex social, political and economic factors, and bears all the earmarks of a traditional, or secessionist, insurgency. This book evaluates the methods used to suppress the Apache insurgency by applying the principles of modern counterinsurgency doctrine. The strength of the government's approach was in its ability to conduct a short, decisive military campaign which defeated most of the hostile bands and induced others to surrender. The major weakness lay in the government's inability to develop a balanced national strategy for dealing with the insurgency. Lack of cooperation between civilian and military agencies led to failed attempts at pacification, an ineffective reservation system, and continued conflict. The experience of the U.S. Government with the Apaches confirms the validity of much of our current doctrine, and offers lessons which can be applied to modern counterinsurgency operations.