Topics in Social Choice: Sophisticated Voting, Efficacy, and Proportional Representation
Autor Dan S. Felsenthalen Limba Engleză Hardback – 22 mai 1990 – vârsta până la 17 ani
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780275934309
ISBN-10: 0275934306
Pagini: 232
Dimensiuni: 156 x 235 x 23 mm
Greutate: 0.53 kg
Ediția:New.
Editura: Bloomsbury Publishing
Colecția Praeger
Locul publicării:New York, United States
ISBN-10: 0275934306
Pagini: 232
Dimensiuni: 156 x 235 x 23 mm
Greutate: 0.53 kg
Ediția:New.
Editura: Bloomsbury Publishing
Colecția Praeger
Locul publicării:New York, United States
Notă biografică
DAN S. FELSENTHAL is Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Haifa, Israel. The author of Mathematics for Administrative Decision Makers (1976), he has published numerous articles on voting, bargaining, coalition theory and public choice theory.
Cuprins
PrefaceSophisticated Voting under the Plurality and Approval Procedures: Theoretical Models and Experimental EvidenceSophisticated Voting: Orientation and General ApproachTwo Models of Sophisticated Voting: Farquharson and Niemi-FrankThe Social Desirability of Sincere and Sophisticated Voting under the Plurality and Approval ProceduresThe Chairman's Paradox and Its Extensions under Sophisticated Plurality and Approval Voting According to Models F and NFThe Condorcet-Efficiency of Sophisticated Voting According to Model F under the Plurality and Approval ProceduresTacit Cooperation in Three-Alternative Noncooperative Voting Games: A New Model of Sophisticated Behavior under the Plurality and Approval ProceduresSincere versus Sophisticated Behavior Under PV and AV: A Competitive Test of Four ModelsEfficacy and "Correct Decisions"Efficacy in Small Electorates under the Plurality and Approval ProceduresIs Cumulative Voting Really Different from Plurality Voting?On Combining Approval with Disapproval VotingMajority Rule, "Correct Decisions," and the Quorum ParadoxProportional Representation: Normative Schemes and an Empirical Evaluation of Voting ProceduresMicrocosms and Macrocosms: Normative Schemes for Seat Allocation in Proportional Representation SystemsProportional Representation: An Empirical Evaluation of the Plurality and Approval ProceduresAppendix A: Possible Size Relations Among Four BlocsAppendix B: Proof of the Propositions in Chapter 6Appendix C: Detailed Results of Experiments 1 and 2BibliographyAuthor IndexSubject Index