The role of airpower in theater campaigns is a matter of heated debate among military services and their supporters. Lt. Col. Robert P. Given's "Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower As a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign" addresses a question that is fundamental to the debate: to what extent can airpower function as a maneuver force in a theater campaign. The US Air Force contends that airpower is a maneuver force and frequently turns to the 1991 Persian Gulf War for evidence in support of their position. Those critical of the Air Force's view argue that Operation Desert Storm was an aberration and charge that arguments based on that essentially unique event are suspect. Seeking to parry the charge of exceptionalism, Givens deliberately sets out to provide a more broadly grounded study that transcends the particular experience of Operation Desert Storm. Colonel Givens begins with a general examination of warfare from ancient Greece to the American Civil War in order to determine the essential functions of a maneuver force. He then examines three distinctly different air operations in reverse chronological order: airpower employment in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the use of airpower in conjunction with South Vietnamese ground forces to frustrate the Communist Easter offensive of 1972, and operations against the Wehrmacht during the 1944 Normandy campaign. The evidence in all three cases suggests that airpower can function as a maneuver force. The conclusion is - if capable of serving as a maneuver force, airpower can greatly enhance the joint theater campaign both independently and in cooperation with other maneuver forces.