With the 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent instability in Iraq, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran find themselves at the center of a struggle for power in the Middle East. The Sunni-dominant Kingdom, with its oil wealth, religious and cultural importance, and Arab voice, competes in a battle to increase soft power influence against the Shiite-dominant Islamic Republic, a nation, strengthened by the collapse of the Hussein, seeking to regain its empirical past. Iran seeks to build its power base through lending support to particular factions in regional struggles. Additionally, others argue that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability not only to deter aggressors but to gain status in the international community. In response to these behaviors, Saudi Arabia remains actively engaged in the region to counterbalance the growth of Iranian influence. Concerned with the stability of the Middle East, the United States continues to implement the remaining half of the dual containment policy initiated by President Clinton, despite conflicting evidence of its true effectiveness. While the motivations of the U.S. and the Kingdom may differ, their dissimilar methods to reduce the influence of Iran are necessary. Two pillars of effort, one at the international level headed by the U.S. and one at the regional level executed by Saudi Arabia, both acting independently, may effectively marginalize Iran as a threat. This thesis identifies the appropriateness of the Saudi approach to handling Iran from a regional perspective and challenges the relevancy of the current U.S. foreign policy, advocating alternative unilateral and multilateral efforts.