This book examines the transformation of the United States Army between 1946 and 1960 as it shifted its approach to warfare from massive mobilization to deterrence based on forces-in-being. In particular it examines methods used to develop managerial characteristics and skills in its officer corps. Throughout the latter part of the 1940¿s the U.S. Army struggled to comprehend and adapt to a changing environment. Ultimately the creation of large, peacetime, forces-in-being resulted in a need for the Army to change not only its approach to warfighting but also its methods of training its managerial cadre-the officer corps. This book traces the changes the Army experienced prior to the Second World War and ties those changes to the Army¿s post World War II transformation. Also, the legislative underpinnings of the Department of Defense and the key geo-political events of the time are examined and placed into an evolutionary flow. This book will appeal to those with a passing interest in the early years of post-World War II American history, global geo-politics, and the U.S. military as well as those conducting scholarly research in any of these areas.