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Unnatural Doubts – Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Skepticism

Autor Michael Williams
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 20 mar 1996
In Unnatural Doubts, Michael Williams constructs a masterly polemic against the very idea of epistemology, as traditionally conceived. Although philosophers have often found problems in efforts to study the nature and limits of human knowledge, Williams provides the first book that systematically argues against there being such a thing as knowledge of the external world. He maintains that knowledge of the world consitutes a theoretically coherent kind of knowledge, whose possibility needs to be defended, only given a deeply problematic doctrine he calls "epistemological realism." The only alternative to epistemological realism is a thoroughgoing contextualism.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780691011158
ISBN-10: 069101115X
Pagini: 416
Dimensiuni: 150 x 227 x 25 mm
Greutate: 0.58 kg
Ediția:Revised
Editura: Princeton University Press
Locul publicării:Princeton, United States

Notă biografică

Michael Williams served fourteen years of a twenty-six year Air Force career as an aerial photographer, of which eleven were spent supporting Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) programs over military test ranges in Utah and New Mexico. As one of five Air Force flight test photographers documenting Department of Defense (DoD) inflight weapon systems tests from 1989 to 1995, he developed new techniques and technologies to capture data more efficiently, and helped advance our nation's air power for today and tomorrow.

Descriere

Constructs a masterly polemic against the very idea of epistemology, as traditionally conceived. This title maintains that knowledge of the world constitutes a theoretically coherent kind of knowledge, whose possibility needs to be defended, only given a deeply problematic doctrine he calls 'epistemological realism.'