Expending every effort to recover distressed personnel from harm's way is an American tradition and one of the nation's highest priorities during conflict. The Air Force maintains a fleet of HH-60G helicopters and HC-130P aircraft along with a contingent of pararescue specialists dedicated to the recovery of personnel isolated on the battlefield. The traditional training, organizing, and equipping focus of this force is the recovery of downed aircrews. This focus stems from doctrine that draws from lessons learned in past contingencies, particularly the Vietnam War, where the Air Force experienced a large number of downed aircrew incidents. A robust capability dedicated exclusively to the combat search and rescue mission area was essential to ensure every effort was made to safely recover and return our aircrews to fight again. While maintaining the capability to recover our aircrews remains sacrosanct for the Air Force, Colonel dePalo argues in this study that the capability exists to go beyond dedicating these forces exclusively to the combat search and rescue mission. The United States' ability to quickly and decisively win a major combat operation creates a situation where we can expect to operate more often in diverse and complex nonlinear battlespace, particularly in the long-term global war on terrorism (GWOT). The changing nature of the battlespace creates an environment much different from traditional combat operations where the Air Force's at-risk population primarily consisted of combat aircrews. The study draws from Colonel dePalo's extensive experience supporting combat rescue operations in the GWOT to demonstrate that the missions flown by USAF combat rescue crews in the GWOT are far different from the traditional rescue of aircrews behind enemy lines seen in more conventional conflicts. In fact, he points out that the Air Force assets have flown missions almost exclusively in support of other components' requirements since air component downed aircrew incidents are virtually nonexistent. Colonel dePalo challenges theater planners to reevaluate the effectiveness of keeping a capable force tied exclusively to a rarely executed mission when their combat power could be used to support other joint force commander objectives in addition to providing combat rescue support.