This book is a study of Adolf Hitler in his role as military commander and strategist from the beginning of the Second World War until the end of 1942, examining in detail the campaign in southern Russia that year.
The thesis challenges the post-war narrative of Hitler as a dilettante who was solely responsible for the strategic and operational errors that led to Germany’s defeat in the war. Instead, this research highlights that decisions made by Hitler with respect to such disparate themes as strategy, operations, logistics, intelligence, economics, air and naval power, and coalition warfare were generally sound if viewed from his perspective, even if they were not ultimately successful. It also gives an overview of his own ideas concerning all aspects of military affairs, such as intelligence, command and morale. The careful analysis of Hitler’s decision-making process offers a unique contribution to Second World War scholarship and moves beyond a superficial understanding that the war’s outcome was a result of Hitler’s ineptitude as a military leader.
Warlord Hitler will appeal to postgraduates and specialists in military history, as well as general readers interested in a deeper study of the Second World War.