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Welfare, Incentives, and Taxation de James Mirrlees

Welfare, Incentives, and Taxation

Autor James Mirrlees
en Limba Engleză Hardback – 15 mar 2006
Nobel Prize-winning economist James Mirrlees is one of the world's leading figures in welfare, development, and public sector economics. This volume brings together for the first time published and unpublished but seminal work in these key areas, and will be a very useful source for anyone looking for a comprehensive picture of Mirrlees' contribution to the subject.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780198295211
ISBN-10: 0198295219
Pagini: 584
Ilustrații: Numerous figures and tables
Dimensiuni: 164 x 242 x 37 mm
Greutate: 1.03 kg
Editura: OUP OXFORD
Colecția OUP Oxford
Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom

Recenzii

James Mirrlees' special gift is to bring new perspectives to the understanding of major economic issues, economic growth and the choice of taxes. The importance of asymmetric information in the optimality of taxes was one of his greatest contributions, the study of different aspects of the role of increasing returns in economic growth another. Drawing these contributions, scattered over many journals, into a single volume will remind of the power of Mirrlees's analysis and make reference that much easier.
Not only does this book belong on the shelves of every economist, also the contents of the papers belong in the undersatnding of every economist.

Notă biografică

James A. Mirrlees is Professor of Political Economy at the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Trinity College. He was previously Edgeworth Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford (1968-95). In 1996 he won the Nobel Prize for Economics for fundamental contributions to the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information. His research interests are optimal income taxation; policy implications of imperfect rationality; and principal/agent situations with multidimensional choice variables.