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Welfare, Incentives, and Taxation de James A. Mirrlees

Welfare, Incentives, and Taxation

Autor James A. Mirrlees
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 16 mar 2006
Nobel Prize-winning economist James Mirrlees is one of the world's leading figures in welfare, development, and public sector economics. This volume brings together for the first time twenty-three of his seminal papers on welfare economics, tax theory, public expenditure, contract theory, growth theory, and development economics.Academic and professional economists, particularly those interested in welfare, development, and public sector economics, will find this collection invaluable.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780199261819
ISBN-10: 0199261814
Pagini: 584
Ilustrații: Numerous tables and line drawings
Dimensiuni: 157 x 233 x 33 mm
Greutate: 0.87 kg
Editura: OUP OXFORD
Colecția OUP Oxford
Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom

Recenzii

James Mirrlees' special gift is to bring new perspectives to the understanding of major economic issues, economic growth and the choice of taxes. The importance of asymmetric information in the optimality of taxes was one of his greatest contributions, the study of different aspects of the role of increasing returns in economic growth another. Drawing these contributions, scattered over many journals, into a single volume will remind of the power of Mirrlees's analysis and make reference that much easier.

Notă biografică

James A. Mirrlees is Professor Emeritus of Political Economy at the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Trinity College. He was previously Edgeworth Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford (1968-95). In 1996 he won the Nobel Prize for Economics for fundamental contributions to the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information. His research interests are optimal income taxation; policy implications of imperfect rationality; and principal/agent situations with multidimensional choice variables.