In their official report of 29 January 1970, the SCORPION Structural Analysis Group (SAG), which included the Navy's leading experts in submarine design, submarine structures, and the effect of underwater explosions, advised the Navy Court of Inquiry (COI) that the US nuclear submarine SCORPION was lost on 22 May 1968 becase of the violent explosion of the main storage battery.<p>The COI disregarded that assessment and concluded SCORPION was lost because of the "explosion of (a) large charge weight externalto the submarine's pressure hull." That erroneous conclusion which, by default, has become the Navy's explanation for the tragedy, contributed to the conspiracy theory that SCORPION was sunk by a Soviet torpedo.<p>This book includes six letters sent to the Navy from 2009 to 2011. These letters provide the results of the first reanalysis in 40 yeears of acoustic detections of the loss of SCORPION. This reanalysis confirms the 1970 SAG battery-explosion assessment and provides important new information on the loss of SCORPION.<p>The author was the lead acoustic analyst at the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) for 42 years, ending in 2007. ONI did not receive any SCORPION acoustic data until the author provided it in October 2009.<p>The book includes a prologue signed by 96 members of the Scorpion families asking the Navy to bring forth further information on the causes of the tragedy.<p>