Advances in Economic Design: Studies in Economic Design
Editat de Murat R. Sertel, Semih Korayen Limba Engleză Hardback – 15 apr 2003
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9783540002673
ISBN-10: 3540002677
Pagini: 476
Ilustrații: XIII, 458 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 35 mm
Greutate: 0.8 kg
Ediția:2003
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Seria Studies in Economic Design
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
ISBN-10: 3540002677
Pagini: 476
Ilustrații: XIII, 458 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 35 mm
Greutate: 0.8 kg
Ediția:2003
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Seria Studies in Economic Design
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
A: Social Choice and Electoral Systems.- Selecting a Social Choice Rule — An Exploratory Panel Study.- Weighted Scoring Rules That Maximize Condorcet Efficiency.- Incentive Contracts and Elections for Politicians and the Down-Up Problem.- B : Buyers and Sellers.- On Determination of Optimal Reserve Price in Auctions with Common Knowledge about Ranking of Valuations.- On Auctions with Interest Linkages among Bidders.- Substitutes, Complements, and Equilibrium in Two-Sided Market Models.- Core Convergence in Two-Sided Matching Markets.- C: Bargaining.- Can and Should the Nash Program Be Looked at as a Part of Mechanism Theory?.- Impossibility of a Walrasian Bargaining Solution.- Characterization of Competitive Allocations and the Nash Bargaining Problem.- Kalai-Smorodinsky and Maschler-Perles Solutions under Pre-donation.- D: Coalitional Stability and Efficiency.- Stable Cartel Structures in a Dismantling Game.- A Sequential Approach to the Characteristic Function and the Core in Games with Externalities.- Coalition Structural Games and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods.- E: Regulating and Organizing Markets.- Regulation and Markets for Catastrophe Insurance.- Incentive Compatible Regulation of Quality Provision by Natural Monopolies — The Role of Technical Progress.- On the Importance of Sequencing of Markets in Monetary Economies.- F: Designing Rights.- The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks.- Designing Severance Payments and Decision Rights for Efficient Plant Closure under Profit-Sharing.- Moral Hazard and Linear Contracts: Economies with Idiosyncratic Risks.- Equal Awards vs. Equal Losses: Duality in Bankruptcy.- G: Information.- Mechanism Design without Games.- Hierarchy Size and Environmental Uncertainty.
Caracteristici
Recent research in economic and political design Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras