Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think: Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society
Autor Peter T. Leesonen Limba Engleză Paperback – 6 apr 2014
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9781107629707
ISBN-10: 1107629705
Pagini: 270
Ilustrații: 4 b/w illus. 5 tables
Dimensiuni: 150 x 226 x 18 mm
Greutate: 0.36 kg
Editura: Cambridge University Press
Colecția Cambridge University Press
Seria Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society
Locul publicării:New York, United States
ISBN-10: 1107629705
Pagini: 270
Ilustrații: 4 b/w illus. 5 tables
Dimensiuni: 150 x 226 x 18 mm
Greutate: 0.36 kg
Editura: Cambridge University Press
Colecția Cambridge University Press
Seria Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society
Locul publicării:New York, United States
Cuprins
1. Anarchy unbound; Part I. Self-Governance and the Problem of Social Diversity: 2. Social distance and self-enforcing exchange; 3. The laws of lawlessness; Part II. Self-Governance and the Problem of Violence: 4. Trading with bandits; 5. Efficient plunder; Part III. Social-Governance and the Problem of 'Bad Apples': 6. Pirates' private order; 7. Criminal constitutions; Part IV. Self-Governance as Superior to the State: 8. Efficient anarchy; 9. Better off stateless; 10. An argument for anarchy in LDCs; 11. A future for thinking about self-governance.
Recenzii
'In the best tradition of Coase, Peter Leeson shows how, in the most surprising times and places, individuals managed to organize their lives and affairs cooperatively without any help from government. The history in this book is fascinating; the economics is powerful; and the writing is beautiful.' Andrei Shleifer, Harvard University, Massachusetts
'With compelling arguments and examples from many different times and societies, Leeson shows how bottom-up institutions of governance work and why their results are often better than what governments achieve. The book is fascinating reading for all economists, and will be an eye-opener to many.' Avinash Dixit, Princeton University, author of Lawlessness and Economics
'A lively, insightful, and masterly work. In taking aim at Thomas Hobbes' view that governments are invariably essential, Leeson invokes historical examples such as the institution of Caribbean pirates and sociological concepts such as social distance. It is rare for an economist to offer riches to social scientists of every stripe.' Robert C. Ellickson, Meyer Professor of Property Law, Yale Law School
'Persuasive arguments for a state of anarchy.' Morning Star
'With compelling arguments and examples from many different times and societies, Leeson shows how bottom-up institutions of governance work and why their results are often better than what governments achieve. The book is fascinating reading for all economists, and will be an eye-opener to many.' Avinash Dixit, Princeton University, author of Lawlessness and Economics
'A lively, insightful, and masterly work. In taking aim at Thomas Hobbes' view that governments are invariably essential, Leeson invokes historical examples such as the institution of Caribbean pirates and sociological concepts such as social distance. It is rare for an economist to offer riches to social scientists of every stripe.' Robert C. Ellickson, Meyer Professor of Property Law, Yale Law School
'Persuasive arguments for a state of anarchy.' Morning Star
Descriere
In Anarchy Unbound, Peter T. Leeson uses rational choice theory to explore the benefits of self-governance.