Over 150 years ago, Carl von Clausewitz offered sage advice: political and military leaders must understand the con ict into which they send their troops. This wisdom certainly applies to armies embarking on peace support operations. But as pointed out by Major D. G. Wilson, who served in Bosnia with the British army, knowing Balkan history is also important in being an effective peacekeeper. In December 1995, the US Army faced an intellectual challenge as it deployed ground troops with the mission of separating the warring factions in Bosnia and of helping create a secure environment for the conduct of civilian reforms. Understanding the character of Bosnian con ict and negotiating through the region's myths proved no easy task. In fact, much of the US Army entered Bosnia with a general misconception of the con ict. The Bosnian war was a complex con ict, lled with myths generated in part by the propaganda machines of the participants themselves. The US media tended to portray images of the good and the bad, with Serbs emerging as the villains and Muslims as the innocent victims. Such a dichotomy stemmed, in large measure, from the horri c character of the war in Bosnia. Out of a prewar population of 4.3 million, 2.2 million Bosnians became refugees or displaced persons; between 200,000 and 250,000 were killed. Most of the dead were civilians who fell victim to ethnic cleansing and acts of revenge. Stories of systematic rape and murder in concentration camps added to the brutality of war. The dark side of human nature had raised its ugly head once again in history, and the Serbs appeared to bear responsibility for the phenomenon. How was an American Army to make sense of the Bosnian war as it deployed ground troops for the rst time in December 1995, over three and a half years after the outbreak of the hostilities?"