Scientists have constructed a vast and wonderful objective universe by building on the ""quantitative"" features of their experience. That universe cannot support cosmic purpose because it is without consciousness--it is completely inert. However, the ""qualitative"" features of human experience suggest the existence of an equally vast and wonderful subjective universe that complements the objective universe in scope and in reality. This edifice can and, I believe, does support a form of cosmic purpose that is determined by its structure, and by its relationship to human consciousness. Every experience of yours is an amalgam of quantitative and qualitative parts that comprise your own objective and subjective worlds. Each one is as real a part of your life as the other; and each is as real a part of the wider universe as the other. There is no reason to assign reality to one and illusory to the other. Using a minimal construction based on qualitative experience, the subjective universe is found to have a cosmic purpose that is consequential for humans. We look for and find evidence of that purpose in human history. ""How many times has consciousness been, or will it be, introduced in different parts of the Universe? These unique events may happen again and again, and the creative ability of consciousness is the story that never may end. 'Consciousness is not possessed by our brains, it is only reflected by our brain, ' and 'The question then is: where does reflected consciousness come from?' are main topics of this approach to Cosmic Purpose and Human Consciousness by Richard Mould, which is the story of ourselves."" --Petr Bob, author, The Brain and Conscious Unity: Freud's Omega Richard A Mould (Ret) was a Professor in the Department of Physics and Astronomy at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. He is author of Basic Relativity (1994), paperback (2004), an advanced textbook covering special and general relativity and cosmology. From the time of his student years, Professor Mould has had a continuing interest in philosophy, particularly in regard to scientific epistemology and ontology. The present work is an expansion of that background.