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Futile Diplomacy, Volume 4: Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1954-1956 de Neil Caplan

Futile Diplomacy, Volume 4: Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1954-1956: Futile Diplomacy

Autor Neil Caplan
en Limba Engleză Hardback – 13 mai 2015
This book, first published in 1997, focuses on the Anglo-American cooperation which began during the relatively uneventful years 1953 and 1954, and which led to a covert operation, code-named 'Alpha', which aimed – unsuccessfully – at convincing Egyptian and Israeli leaders to consider a settlement through secret negotiations. As with the other three volumes that make up Futile Diplomacy, this volume comprises Dr Caplan's expert in-depth analysis with a wealth of primary source documents, making this a key reference source in the study of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9781138905252
ISBN-10: 1138905259
Pagini: 438
Dimensiuni: 156 x 234 mm
Greutate: 0.75 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: Taylor & Francis
Colecția Routledge
Seria Futile Diplomacy

Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom

Public țintă

Postgraduate and Undergraduate

Cuprins

Part 1. The Background of Anglo-American Cooperation, 1948-54  1. Anglo-American Support for Bilateral and United Nations Peace Efforts  1.1. Dynamics of Anglo-American Cooperation  1.2. Support for Bilateral Negotiations  1.3. Support for United Nations Initiatives  2. The Two-Pronged Approach  2.1. 'A Gradual Process of Education' of the Arabs to Accept Israel  2.2. Pressure on Israel for Gestures and Concessions  3. Nibbling at the Edges: The Failure of Conflict Management  3.1. The Tripartite Declaration  3.2. Diplomatic Representations in Support of UNTSO  3.3. Anglo-American Proposals for Reducing Frontier Tensions  3.4. Starting a Chain of Confidence-Building Measures  3.5. From the 'Edges' Back to the Core Issues  4. Attempts at Conflict Resolution  4.1. Calls for a 'Positive Policy' – A Settlement by Compulsion?  4.2. American and British Plans for a Comprehensive Settlement  4.3. Convergence of British and American Thinking  Part 2. The Best Laid Plans  5. Preparing Alpha  5.1. British Good Offices Offered  5.2. Looking for an Arab Opening; Keeping the Israelis Reassured  5.3. From Cooperation to Collaboration: Formulation of Anglo-American Terms of Settlement  6. First Approaches  6.1. Eden and Nasir: First Hints of Alpha  6.2. Setbacks: Baghdad Pact and Gaza Raid  6.3. Byroade, Fawzi and Nasir: Early Probings  6.4. London and Paris Meetings: Fine-Tuning the Negev Proposals  6.5. Factoring in Israel: Security Treaty versus Arab-Israeli Settlement  Part 3. Stumbling from Obstacle to Obstacle  7. From Secret Sounding to Public Pronouncements: The Dulles Statement, August 1955  7.1. The Dulles Statement, August 1955  7.2. The Waiting Game, April-August 1955  7.3. Dulles' Decision to Go Public  7.4. The Dulles Statement  7.5. Aftermath  8. Arms and Alpha: The Arab Connection  8.1. Western Arms and Aid for the Arabs  8.2. Soviet Arms for Egypt: The End of the Tripartite Monopoly  8.3. Sharett's Hat-in-Hand Diplomacy: Paris and Geneva  8.4. Fears of an Israeli Pre-emptive Strike  8.5. New Moves to Court Nasir  9. Eden's Guildhall Speech, November 1955  9.1. Guildhall Speech: Seeking a Compromise between 1947 and the Status Quo  9.2. Arab Reactions  9.3. The Israeli Reaction  9.4. Mahmud Fawzi: Principles behind the Egyptian Position  10. Showdown with Sharett  10.1. Build-Up to a Confrontation between the US and Israel  10.2. Dulles' 'Bombshell Surprise', 21 November 1955  10.3. Not Another Munich: Israel Sets Out its Position  10.4. A New Israeli 'Peace Offensive'?  10.5. Finessing US-Israeli Differences  10.6. Between Optimism and Pessimism  11. Arms and Alpha: The Israeli Connection  11.1. Hesitations Regarding Israel's Arms Requests  11.2. Lake Kinneret Raid  11.3. Arms as Carrots for Negotiations  11.4. Arms and the Anderson Mission  11.5. A Brief Assessment  12. Alpha's Last Chance: The Anderson Mission  12.1. Preparing for American Mediation  12.2. Anderson's Mission: Mandate and Expectations  12.3. First Meetings in Cairo  12.4. First Meetings in Israel  12.5. Return to Cairo  12.6. Return to Jerusalem  12.7. Interlude: Washington, Cairo, Jerusalem  Conclusions  13. Alpha and Gamma: Post-Scripts and Post-Mortems  13.1. 'Last Shot' at a Meeting between Nasir and Ben-Gurion  13.2. Anderson's Final Visit  13.3. From 'Alpha' to 'Omega'  13.4. The Principal Players: Nasir and Israel  14. Carrots and Sticks: The Limits of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy  14.1. Militant Protagonists and International Opinion  14.2. The Context: British and American Interests  14.3. Carrots and Sticks: An Inventory  14.4. Anglo-American Cooperation  14.5. American and British Presumptions  14.6. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy  14.7. 'Arms and the Dam'  15. Documents

Descriere

This book, first published in 1997, focuses on the Anglo-American cooperation which began during the relatively uneventful years 1953 and 1954, and which led to a covert operation, code-named 'Alpha', which aimed – unsuccessfully – at convincing Egyptian and Israeli leaders to consider a settlement through secret negotiations. As with the other three volumes that make up Futile Diplomacy, this volume comprises Dr Caplan's expert in-depth analysis with a wealth of primary source documents, making this a key reference source in the study of the Arab-Israeli conflict.