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Futile Diplomacy, Volume 3: The United Nations, the Great Powers and Middle East Peacemaking, 1948-1954 de Neil Caplan

Futile Diplomacy, Volume 3: The United Nations, the Great Powers and Middle East Peacemaking, 1948-1954: Futile Diplomacy

Autor Neil Caplan
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 10 noi 2016
This book, first published in 1997, provides a careful and balanced behind-the-scenes account of the intricate diplomatic activity of the period between the first and second Arab-Israeli wars. The author examines the recurring deadlocks in terms of the motives and calculations of the various parties, and reveals how new incentives of pressures offered by outsiders proved incapable of reversing the serious deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations as the region headed for war at Suez. The text of this volume comprises both an in-depth analysis of the period and events, and a selection of primary documents from archival sources.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9781138907546
ISBN-10: 1138907545
Pagini: 418
Dimensiuni: 156 x 234 x 22 mm
Greutate: 0.61 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: Taylor & Francis
Colecția Routledge
Seria Futile Diplomacy

Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom

Public țintă

Postgraduate and Undergraduate

Cuprins

1. Historical and Psychological Context  1.1. Lessons from the Mandate Period  1.2. Changing Structure and Dynamics of the Post-1948 Conflict  1.3. Forms of Third-Party Intervention in the Arab-Israeli Dispute  1.4. The Maze of Mutual Perceptions and Misconceptions  2. War and Mediation, 1948  2.1. Bernadotte's 'Suggestions', 27 June 1948  2.2. Direct Negotiations  2.3. The Bernadotte Plan, September 1948: Acquiescence versus Agreement  2.4. Patterns and Precedents  3. Egypt and Israel at Rhodes  3.1. United Nations Peacemaking: Two Tracks  3.2. From Truce to Armistice  3.3. Getting to the Table  3.4. Opening of Talks  3.5. Breakthrough: Signing the Armistice Agreement  3.6. From Armistice to Peace?  4. The Lausanne Conference: Prenegotiation  4.1. The Palestine Conciliation Commission  4.2. Preparing the Ground  4.3. Shuttle Diplomacy  4.4. Quest for an Advance Gesture from Israel  4.5. PCC Beirut Conference, March 1949  4.6. Continuing Pressure for an Israeli Gesture  4.7. The Shadow of Rhodes  4.8. Strains in the Arab Common Front  5. Manoeuvring at Lausanne  5.1. Opening the Conference  5.2. A Basis for Discussion: The Lausanne Protocol, 12 May 1949  5.3. Staking out the Positions: The First Deadlock  5.4. Israel's Offer to Incorporate the Gaza Strip  6. Lausanne: The Final Stalemate  6.1. July Recess  6.2. Resumption of the Conference  6.3. Israel's Offer to Repatriate 100,000 Refugees  6.4. Continued Conciliation or Imposed Settlement?  6.5. Winding up the Conference  6.6. Lausanne Postcripts  7. Geneva Interlude  7.1. Years of Drift  7.2. From Conciliation to Mediation?  7.3. Bilateral Negotiations  7.4. PCC Geneva Meetings, January-July 1950  8. Deterioration of the Armistice  8.1. From Negative Peace to Positive Peace?  8.2. Beginnings of the Arms Race  8.3. Regional Stability and Arms Control: The Tripartite Declaration, May 1950  8.4. The Entrenchment of Israeli and Arab Positions  8.5. Piecemeal Approaches: 'Knitting Tissue' over the Wound  9. PCC Paris Conference, Autumn 1951  9.1. From Atrophy to Activity: Ely Palmer, the State Department, and the PCC Initiative  9.2. Preparing the Conference  9.3. The Conference Begins  9.4. The PCC's Comprehensive Pattern of Proposal  10. The Paris Conference and the Demise of PCC Mediation  10.1. Draft Non-Aggression Formulae  10.2. From Preamble to Proposals  10.3. Paris Deadlock and the General Assembly  10.4. The Final Sessions: 14 November 1951  10.5. The Demise of the PCC and United Nations Mediation  11. The United Nations and Direct Negotiations, 1952-53  11.1. The Seventh General Assembly (1952): Eight-Power Draft Resolution  11.2. Changes during 1953: Qibiya and Israeli-Jordanian Tensions  11.3. The Israeli Call for Direct Negotiations: November 1953  12. The United Nations Conference that Never Was, 1953-54  12.1. Invoking Article XII: The First Stages  12.2. Arab Reactions to International Pressure  12.3. Responses to Jordan's Refusal Aftermath  13. Conclusion  13.1. Assessment of the Arab-Israeli Impasse  13.2. Approaches to Conflict Resolution  13.3. American Leverage on the Parties  13.4. Techniques of Conciliation  13.5. The Attitudes and Positions of the Parties  13.6. From War to War  14. Documents

Descriere

This book, first published in 1997, provides a careful and balanced behind-the-scenes account of the intricate diplomatic activity of the period between the first and second Arab-Israeli wars. The author examines the recurring deadlocks in terms of the motives and calculations of the various parties, and reveals how new incentives of pressures offered by outsiders proved incapable of reversing the serious deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations as the region headed for war at Suez. The text of this volume comprises both an in-depth analysis of the period and events, and a selection of primary documents from archival sources.