Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals, and Markets
Editat de Reinhard Selten Contribuţii de D. Abreu, W. Albers, K. Binmore, R. G. Ardner, W. Güth, R.M. Harstad, H. Kliemt, W. Leininger, A. Okada, E. Ostrom, D. Pearce, L. Philips, S.H. Schanuel, L.K. Simon, J. Sobel, G. Stephan, E. van Damme, J.W. Walker, F. Weissing, W.R. Zameen Limba Engleză Hardback – 16 aug 1991
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9783540542261
ISBN-10: 3540542264
Pagini: 384
Ilustrații: IX, 369 p.
Dimensiuni: 170 x 244 x 31 mm
Greutate: 0.71 kg
Ediția:1991
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
ISBN-10: 3540542264
Pagini: 384
Ilustrații: IX, 369 p.
Dimensiuni: 170 x 244 x 31 mm
Greutate: 0.71 kg
Ediția:1991
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models”.- to Volume II: “Methods, Morals and Markets”.- The Algebraic Geometry of Games and the Tracing Procedure.- A Perspective on Renegotiation in Repeated Games.- On Supergames and Folk Theorems: A Conceptual Discussion.- It’s Not What You Know, It’s Who You Play.- Game Theory and the Social Contract.- Anarchy and Agreement — a Game Theoretic Analysis of Some Aspects of Contractarianism.- Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement without Guards.- Equilibrium Selection in the Spence Signaling Game.- Interaction Between Resource Extraction and Futures Markets: A Game-Theoretic Analysis.- A Framing Effect Observed in a Market Game.- Rent Dissipation and Balanced Deviation Disequilibrium in Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence.