Game Equilibrium Models IV: Social and Political Interaction
Editat de Reinhard Selten Contribuţii de R. Avenhaus, R. G. Ardner, W. Güth, R.K. Huber, M. Mitzkewitz, A. Okada, B. O'Neill, J. Pool, J. Potters, R. Selten, F. van Winden, D. Wendt, S. Zamiren Limba Engleză Hardback – 16 aug 1991
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9783540542285
ISBN-10: 3540542280
Pagini: 380
Ilustrații: XI, 363 p.
Dimensiuni: 170 x 244 x 31 mm
Greutate: 0.71 kg
Ediția:1991
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
ISBN-10: 3540542280
Pagini: 380
Ilustrații: XI, 363 p.
Dimensiuni: 170 x 244 x 31 mm
Greutate: 0.71 kg
Ediția:1991
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models”.- to Volume IV: “Social and Political Interaction”.- Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection.- Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?.- The Distributiun of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium.- Resisting the Draft. A Perfect Equilibrium Approach.- Altruism in Social Dilemmas — Failure to Catch It in a Parameter.- The Strategy of Challenges: Two Beheading Games in Mediaeval Literature.- Balance of Power in a Parlor Game.- Modelling Alliance Formation: A Noncooperative Approach.- The (Stability of the) Western Defense Alliance — A Game Theoretic Analysis —.- Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Part I: Games with and without Complete Information about the Antagonist’s Intentions.- Implicatidns of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Part II: A Sequential Game Including the Possibility of Restructuring Forces.- Inspector Leadership with Incomplete Information.