Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research: Theory and Decision Library C, cartea 18
Editat de T. Parthasarathy, B. Dutta, J.A.M. Potters, T.E.S. Raghaven, D. Ray, A. Senen Limba Engleză Hardback – 31 aug 1997
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780792347125
ISBN-10: 0792347129
Pagini: 320
Ilustrații: XIV, 302 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 23 mm
Greutate: 0.63 kg
Ediția:1997
Editura: Springer Us
Colecția Springer
Seria Theory and Decision Library C
Locul publicării:New York, NY, United States
ISBN-10: 0792347129
Pagini: 320
Ilustrații: XIV, 302 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 23 mm
Greutate: 0.63 kg
Ediția:1997
Editura: Springer Us
Colecția Springer
Seria Theory and Decision Library C
Locul publicării:New York, NY, United States
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
I Two-Person Games.- Computing Linear Minimax Estimators.- Incidence Matrix Games.- Completely Mixed Games and Real Jacobian Conjecture.- Probability of obtaining a pure strategy equilibrium in matrix games with random pay-offs.- II Cooperative Games.- Nonlinear Self Dual Solutions for TU Games.- The Egalitarian Nonpairwise-averaged Contribution.- Consistency Properties of the Nontransferable Cooperative Game solutions.- Reduced Game Property of Egalitarian Division Rules for Cooperative Games.- III Noncooperative Games.- An implementation of the Nucleolus of NTU Games.- Pure Strategy Nash Equilibirum Points in Large Non-Anonymous Games.- Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information The Deterministic Symmetric Case.- On Stable Sets of Equilibria.- IV Linear Complementarity Problems and Game Theory.- A Chain condition for Qo-Matrices.- Linear Complementarity and the Irriducible Polystochastic Game with the Average Cost Criterion when one Player Controls Transition.- On the Lipschihtz Continuity of the Solution Map in Some Generalized Linear Complementarity Problems.- V Economic and or Applications.- Pari-Mutuel as a system of aggregation of information.- Genetic Algorithm of the Core of NTU Games.- Some recent algorithms for finding the nucleolus of structured cooperative games.- The characterisation of the Uniform Reallocation Rule Without Pareto Optimality.- Two Level Negotiations in Bargaining Over Water.- Price Rule and Volatility in Auctions with Resale Markets.- Monetary trade, Market specialisation and strategic behaviour.