Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities: Monetary Policy and Wage Bargaining Institutions in EMU
Editat de Robert Franzese, Peter Mooslechner, Martin Schürzen Limba Engleză Hardback – 31 dec 2003
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9781402075360
ISBN-10: 1402075367
Pagini: 288
Ilustrații: V, 278 p.
Dimensiuni: 160 x 240 x 21 mm
Greutate: 0.6 kg
Ediția:2004
Editura: Springer Us
Colecția Springer
Locul publicării:New York, NY, United States
ISBN-10: 1402075367
Pagini: 288
Ilustrații: V, 278 p.
Dimensiuni: 160 x 240 x 21 mm
Greutate: 0.6 kg
Ediția:2004
Editura: Springer Us
Colecția Springer
Locul publicării:New York, NY, United States
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
1. Editorial.- 2. Strategic Interactions of the ECB, Wage Bargainers, and Governments.- 3. Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities.- 4. Wage and Wage-Bargaining Institutions in EMU: A Survey of the Issues.- 5. Multiple Wage Bargaining Systems in the Single European Currency Area.- 6. Strategic Wage Setting in a Monetary Union.- 7. Interest Groups, Enlargement of the EMU and Labor Market Reform.- 8. Does Price Stability Exacerbate Labor Market Rigidities in EMU.- 9. Communication, Coordination and Common Knowledge in Monetary Policy: Implications for the Euro Area.- 10. The European Central Bank: Implications of the Appointment Process for Monetary Policy.- 11. Who’s is Afraid of the Big Bad Central Bank? Union-Firm-Central Bank Interactions and Inflation in a Monetary Union.- 12. Institutional Complementarities and Conflicts between Wage Bargaining Institutions and an Independent Central Bank.