Internet and Network Economics: Third International Workshop,WINE 2007, San Diego, CA, USA, December 12-14, 2007, Proceedings: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, cartea 4858

WINE 2007.- Getting to Economic Equilibrium: A Problem and Its History.- My Favorite Simplicial Complex and Some of Its Applications.- Markets and the Primal-Dual Paradigm.- The Computation of Equilibria.- A Note on Equilibrium Pricing as Convex Optimization.- New Algorithms for Approximate Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games.- A Unified Approach to Congestion Games and Two-Sided Markets.- An Optimization Approach for Approximate Nash Equilibria.- Gradient-Based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games.- Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets.- Pari-Mutuel Markets: Mechanisms and Performance.- Information Sharing Communities.- Competitive Safety Strategies in Position Auctions.- Maintaining Equilibria During Exploration in Sponsored Search Auctions.- Stochastic Models for Budget Optimization in Search-Based Advertising.- Auctions with Revenue Guarantees for Sponsored Search.- Equilibrium Analysis of Dynamic Bidding in Sponsored Search Auctions.- Cooperative or Vindictive: Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search Auction.- Cost-Balancing Tolls for Atomic Network Congestion Games.- Network Formation: Bilateral Contracting and Myopic Dynamics.- Who Should Pay for Forwarding Packets?.- On the Performance of Congestion Games for Optimum Satisfiability Problems.- Incentive-Compatible Interdomain Routing with Linear Utilities.- Mechanism Design I.- False-Name-Proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team.- Mechanism Design on Trust Networks.- Stochastic Mechanism Design.- A Note on Maximizing the Spread of Influence in Social Networks.- A Network Creation Game with Nonuniform Interests.- A Theory of Loss-Leaders: Making Money by Pricing Below Cost.- PageRank as a Weak Tournament Solution.- Competitive Influence Maximization in Social Networks.- Advertisement Pricing I.- Sponsored Search with Contexts.- Capacity Constraints and the Inevitability of Mediators in Adword Auctions.- Cost of Conciseness in Sponsored Search Auctions.- Adwords Auctions with Decreasing Valuation Bids.- An Adaptive Sponsored Search Mechanism ?-Gain Truthful in Valuation, Time, and Budget.- Extending Polynomial Time Computability to Markets with Demand Correspondences.- Market Equilibrium Using Auctions for a Class of Gross-Substitute Utilities.- Continuity Properties of Equilibrium Prices and Allocations in Linear Fisher Markets.- Computing Market Equilibrium: Beyond Weak Gross Substitutes.- On Competitiveness in Uniform Utility Allocation Markets.- Total Latency in Singleton Congestion Games.- The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games.- Secure Relative Performance Scheme.- Selfishness, Collusion and Power of Local Search for the ADMs Minimization Problem.- The Wi-Fi Roaming Game.- On the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific Network Congestion Games.- The Stable Roommates Problem with Globally-Ranked Pairs.- A PSPACE-complete Sperner Triangle Game.- Group Dominant Strategies.- Weighted Boolean Formula Games.- Core Stability of Vertex Cover Games.- Mechanism Design II.- Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions.- Approximate Mechanisms for the Graphical TSP and Other Graph Traversal Problems.- To Be or Not to Be (Served).- Advertisement Pricing II.- Ad Auction Design and User Experience.- Personalized Ad Delivery When Ads Fatigue: An Approximation Algorithm.- Empirical Price Modeling for Sponsored Search.- Pay-per-action Model for Online Advertising.- Public Advertisement Broker Markets.- Mechanism Design III.- K-NCC: Stability Against Group Deviations in Non-cooperative Computation.- Monotone Properties ofRandomized Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions.- Computing Optimal Bundles for Sponsored Search.- On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions.- Characterizing Truthful Market Design.