"This book addresses the question of what unifies the French philosophical tradition across the twentieth century by exploring these two questions. Kant claimed that the structure of experience mirrored the categories of thought because the cognitive faculties of the subject played a constitutive role in structuring experience. As such, the structure of thought for Kant is fundamentally tied to the nature of metaphysics. In developing his account of what thinking entailed, Kant took judgement, the attribution of a predicate to a subject, to be the paradigm act of thinking. Throughout the nineteenth century, efforts to move beyond Kant's model of thinking as judgement centred on the attempt to augment that model. For instance, Hegel saw Kant's account of judgement as an essentially fixed form of the true nature of thinking, and therefore developed a more processual account of thinking. His account still ultimately operates by putting judgement into motion, however, rather than rejecting the model of thinking as judgement itself. Conversely, philosophers such as Schelling who do not understand thinking solely in terms of judging often retreat into an indeterminate mysticism, thus retaining the idea that anything positive that can be said about thought must take judgement as a model"--