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Learning and Coordination: Inductive Deliberation, Equilibrium and Convention: Studies in Ethics

Autor Peter Vanderschraaf
en Limba Engleză Hardback – 28 mar 2001
Vanderschraaf develops a new theory of game theory equilibrium selection in this book. The new theory defends general correlated equilibrium concepts and suggests a new analysis of convention.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780815340393
ISBN-10: 0815340397
Pagini: 244
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 x 19 mm
Greutate: 0.43 kg
Ediția:New.
Editura: Taylor & Francis
Colecția Routledge
Seria Studies in Ethics

Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom

Notă biografică

Peter Vanderschraaf is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Social and Decision Sciences at Carnegie Mellon University.

Cuprins

1. Social Interactions and Principles of Rational Decision; 1.0 Introduction; 1.1 Examples of Social Coordination Problems; 1.2 Noncooperative Games; 1.3 Nash Equilibrium; 1.4 Examples Revisited; 1.5 Equilibrium-in-Beliefs; 1.6 Conclusions; 2. Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibrium Concepts; 2.0 Introduction; 2.1 Rationalizability; 2.3 Correlated Equilibrium Concepts; 3. Equilibrium Selection via Inductive Dynamic Deliberation; 3.0 Introduction; 3.1 The Dirichlet Rule; 3.2 Inductive Deliberation with Endogenous Correlation; 3.3 Correlating With Stages of the World; 3.4 Dirichlet Dynamics With Imperfect Memory; 3.5 Random Sampling Dirichlet Deliberation; 3.6 Deliberators With Variable States; 4. The Emergence of Social Convention; 4.0 Introduction; 4.1 Lewis' Characterization of Conventions; 4.2 Convention as Correlated Equilibrium; 4.3 Dynamical Explanations of Conventions; References; Index