This volume completes the story of the logistic support of U.S. forces in the European theater, carrying the account forward from mid-September 1944 to the end of hostilities in May 1945. It follows the pattern, established in "Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I," of focusing on the influence which logistical support or lack of it had on the planning and the conduct of tactical operations. The inclination consequently has been to concentrate on the problem areas in logistic support, such as port discharge and transportation difficulties, and supply and manpower shortages. It is as important a book for combat commanders as for those who have to plan and execute logistical operations. It will leave the nonmilitary reader in no doubt of the enormous weight and complexity of the administrative burden that the Army had to assume to assure the success of its ground and air forces, and the resourcefulness with which it managed that burden. On the other hand, those who have to think about the future can here study a test of the principle of a single service of supply supporting the national element of allied forces under a coalition headquarters and a supreme allied commander.