Cantitate/Preț
Produs

Making Constitutions: Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America

Autor Gabriel L. Negretto
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 16 iul 2014
Negretto provides the first systematic explanation of the origins of constitutional designs from an analytical, historical and comparative perspective. Based on analysis of constitutional change in Latin America from 1900 to 2008 and four detailed case studies, Negretto shows the main determinants of constitutional choice are the past performance of constitutions in providing effective and legitimate instruments of government and the strategic interests of the actors who have influence over institutional selection. The book explains how governance problems shape the general guidelines for reform, while strategic calculations and power resources affect the selection of specific alternatives of design. It emphasizes the importance of events that trigger reform and the designers' level of electoral uncertainty for understanding the relative impact of short-term partisan interests on constitution writing. Negretto's study challenges predominant theories of institutional choice and paves the way for the development of a new research agenda on institutional change.
Citește tot Restrânge

Toate formatele și edițiile

Toate formatele și edițiile Preț Express
Paperback (1) 28133 lei  6-8 săpt.
  Cambridge University Press – 16 iul 2014 28133 lei  6-8 săpt.
Hardback (1) 70482 lei  6-8 săpt.
  Cambridge University Press – 16 iun 2013 70482 lei  6-8 săpt.

Preț: 28133 lei

Nou

Puncte Express: 422

Preț estimativ în valută:
5386 5598$ 4465£

Carte tipărită la comandă

Livrare economică 05-19 februarie 25

Preluare comenzi: 021 569.72.76

Specificații

ISBN-13: 9781107670983
ISBN-10: 1107670985
Pagini: 296
Ilustrații: 14 b/w illus. 26 tables
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 x 17 mm
Greutate: 0.44 kg
Editura: Cambridge University Press
Colecția Cambridge University Press
Locul publicării:New York, United States

Cuprins

Part I. The Logic of Constitutional Choice: Theory and Data: 1. Constitutional change and patterns of design; 2. A two-level theory of constitutional choice; 3. Determinants of variation in constitutional choice; Part II. Case Studies: The Origins of Reforms: 4. Constitutional change as a means to consolidate power: Argentina 1949; 5. Constitutional change as a strategy to redistribute power: Argentina 1994; 6. Constitutional change as a response to state failure: Colombia 1991; 7. Constitutional change as a remedy for ungovernability: Ecuador 1998.

Recenzii

'Gabriel Negretto challenges the traditional wisdom, largely inspired by the experiences of the United Kingdom and the United States, which conceives constitutions as stable frameworks for political action. With a focus on Latin America, he shows that constitutions can be as unstable as political parties and electoral behavior are in the region, thus making the choices of institutions endogenous to the political process. This work will be of interest to students of political institutions everywhere.' Josep Colomer, Georgetown University
'This is a terrific book. There are very few studies of institutional choice in Latin America, and fewer still grounded in both theory and careful on-the-ground research. The book shows that in unusual circumstances, when the whole political elite is threatened by widespread and sometimes violent opposition, constitution writers may cooperate across party lines to choose provisions expected to increase government efficiency and responsiveness. Most of the time, however, the partisan interests of constitution makers motivate revisions expected to help them win future elections and enact policies to benefit their supporters.' Barbara Geddes, University of California, Los Angeles
'Despite the fact that constitutional design in Latin America has occurred all too frequently, it is poorly understood. Negretto's volume elucidates the interaction of politics and environment in producing particular constitutional designs. Combining theoretical clarity, rigorous data analysis, and close readings of important cases, this book will be the state of the art for years to come.' Tom Ginsburg, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, University of Chicago Law School
'This book explains the choices of institutions regarding presidential and congressional powers in post-1900 Latin America. Gabriel Negretto argues that parties choose rules that they expect to work to their own advantage and hence that the relative power of parties is key to understanding institutional choice. This is the most detailed examination of institutional choice that has been undertaken in Latin American politics, and perhaps in comparative politics as a whole.' Scott Mainwaring, Eugene P. and Helen Conley Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame
'Making Constitutions is a seminal book that sets a new standard for empirical legal scholars and for the political scientists concerned with institutional design. It is part of an emerging trend of scholarly work seeking to predict the content of constitutional rules … this volume will therefore serve as an exemplar for scholars interested in explaining other features of constitutional design in the years to come.' Anibal Perez-Linan, Journal of Latin American Studies
'Gabriel Negretto has produced a masterful book that helps us to understand constitutional politics in the region and beyond. Integrating quantitative analysis with a series of case studies, Negretto's innovative analysis makes this book required reading for students of constitutional design.' Political Science Quarterly

Notă biografică


Descriere

Examines constitutional change in Latin America from 1900 to 2008 and provides the first systematic explanation of the origins of constitutional designs.