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Mind, Language and Subjectivity: Minimal Content and the Theory of Thought: Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy

Autor Nicholas Georgalis
en Limba Engleză Hardback – 23 oct 2014
In this monograph Nicholas Georgalis further develops his important work on minimal content, recasting and providing novel solutions to several of the fundamental problems faced by philosophers of language. His theory defends and explicates the importance of ‘thought-tokens’ and minimal content and their many-to-one relation to linguistic meaning, challenging both ‘externalist’ accounts of thought and the solutions to philosophical problems of language they inspire. The concepts of idiolect, use, and statement made are critically discussed, and a classification of kinds of utterances is developed to facilitate the latter. This is an important text for those interested in current theories and debates on philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and their points of intersection.
 
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9781138795969
ISBN-10: 1138795968
Pagini: 270
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 x 23 mm
Greutate: 0.52 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: Taylor & Francis
Colecția Routledge
Seria Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy

Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom

Public țintă

Postgraduate and Undergraduate

Cuprins

1. Minimal Content and Intentionality  2. More on Minimal Content and Related Issues  3. Thinking Differently about Thought and Language  4. The Superiority of the New Theory to Frege’s  5. Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief Solved  6. Use, Idiolect, and Statement Made  7. Speaker’s Referent  8. Speaker’s Referent and the Referential/Attributive Distinction  9. Proper Names  10. Solutions to Classic Problems  11. Securing Determinate Meaning—Part I: Against Kripkenstein  12. Securing Determinate Meaning—Part II: Against Quine

Recenzii

'Philosophical conversations tend to wear deep ruts into the intellectual landscape, and the continuations of these conversations often have a hard time finding their way out of these ruts. In the case of meaning…there are problematic assumptions to the effect (1) that there is something called "meaning" or "content" that can be attributed univocally to thought-tokens and utterances (much less sentences), and (2) that an analysis of "meaning" should be restricted to facts accessible from a third-person perspective….This book stands out as one of the few things I’ve read to take on these assumptions in a sustained fashion, proposes an alternative that distinguishes the content of thought-tokens from linguistic meaning, and does so in a way that emphasizes the uniquely first-person element of minimal content. This makes it, in my opinion, an important and much-needed book.' -- Steven Horst, Wesleyan University, USA

'As mentioned at the beginning of this review, there is an increasing number of philosophers who reject externalism. Georgalis's framework stands out as a bold and original alternative. The insistence that we need to take the first-person perspective seriously is powerfully motivated.' - Joe Y.F. Lau, The University of Hong Kong, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Descriere

In this monograph Nicholas Georgalis further develops his important work on minimal content, recasting and providing novel solutions to several of the fundamental problems faced by philosophers of language. His theory defends and explicates the importance of ‘thought-tokens’ and minimal content and their many-to-one relation to linguistic meaning, challenging both ‘externalist’ accounts of thought and the solutions to philosophical problems of language they inspire. The concepts of idiolect, use, and statement made are critically discussed, and a classification of kinds of utterances is developed to facilitate the latter. This is an important text for those interested in current theories and debates on philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and their points of intersection.