Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence
Autor Keith B. Payne, James Schlesingeren Limba Engleză Paperback – 18 dec 2020
Proponents of a "Minimum Deterrent" US nuclear force posture believe that anywhere from a handful to a few hundred nuclear weapons are adequate to deter reliably and predictably any enemy from attacking the United States now and in the future. Because nuclear weapons are so destructive, their thinking goes, no foreign leader would dare challenge US capabilities. The benefits, advocates claim, of reducing US nuclear weapons to the "minimum" level needed are: better relations with Russia and China, reinforcement of the arms control and Nonproliferation Treaty, billions of defense dollars in savings, and greater international stability on the way to "nuclear zero."
As political pressure builds to pursue this vision of minimum US deterrence, Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence stands as the seminal study to address the many claims of great benefit against available empirical evidence.
This book was published as a National Institute Press monograph, Keith B. Payne and James Schlesinger, Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2013) and as a special issue of Comparative Strategy.
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780367739164
ISBN-10: 036773916X
Pagini: 122
Dimensiuni: 174 x 246 mm
Greutate: 0.23 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: Taylor & Francis
Colecția Routledge
Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom
ISBN-10: 036773916X
Pagini: 122
Dimensiuni: 174 x 246 mm
Greutate: 0.23 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: Taylor & Francis
Colecția Routledge
Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom
Cuprins
Preface Executive Summary I. Introduction: Minimum Deterrence II. Minimum Deterrence and U.S. Policy III. Minimum Deterrence: Assumptions, Logic and Conclusions IV. Examining and Testing the Fundamental Assumptions and Logic of Minimum Deterrence V. Summary and Conclusion: How Does Minimum Deterrence Fare Against Available Evidence and What Alternative Guidelines May Be Better? Notes Appendix
Recenzii
"Schlesinger and Payne critically evaluate eight key assumptions underlying the strategy of minimum nuclear deterrence. They conclude that the diplomatic benefits of reducing the United States’ weapons store to the lowest level ‘required’ are outweighed by the risk of attack if the perceived threat of US nuclear retaliation is reduced." - Lanxin Xiang, (2014)
Notă biografică
Keith B. Payne, Study Director; President, National Institute for Public Policy; Department Head, graduate school of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Washington, DC campus)
The Honorable James Schlesinger, Chairman, Senior Review Group, former Secretary of Defense; Secretary of Energy; Director of Central Intelligence; Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission
The Honorable James Schlesinger, Chairman, Senior Review Group, former Secretary of Defense; Secretary of Energy; Director of Central Intelligence; Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission
Descriere
Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence critically reviews against available evidence the basic assumptions and arguments of "Minimum Deterrence" and finds their claims that the US nuclear force can be safely cut to very low numbers to be demonstrably false and imprudent.
This book was published as a special issue of
This book was published as a special issue of