Parliaments and Government Termination
Editat de Bjørn Erik Rasch, Reuven y. Hazanen Limba Engleză Paperback – 18 dec 2024
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Taylor & Francis Ltd. – 18 dec 2024 | 311.70 lei 6-8 săpt. | |
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9781032501727
ISBN-10: 1032501723
Pagini: 250
Dimensiuni: 156 x 234 mm
Greutate: 0.48 kg
Editura: Taylor & Francis Ltd.
ISBN-10: 1032501723
Pagini: 250
Dimensiuni: 156 x 234 mm
Greutate: 0.48 kg
Editura: Taylor & Francis Ltd.
Notă biografică
Reuven Y. Hazan is Professor and Chair in Israeli Politics and Democracy in the Department of Political Science at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.
Bjørn Erik Rasch is Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo, Norway.
Bjørn Erik Rasch is Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo, Norway.
Cuprins
1. Parliaments and government termination: understanding the confidence relationship 2. Constitutional parliamentarism in Europe, 1800–2019 3. The vote of no confidence: towards a framework for analysis 4. Prime ministers, the vote of confidence and the management of coalition terminations between elections 5. Termination of parliamentary governments: revised definitions and implications 6. The effect of the constructive vote of no-confidence on government termination and government durability 7. Government termination in Europe: a sensitivity analysis 8. Party-system polarisation, legislative institutions and cabinet survival in 28 parliamentary democracies, 1945–2019 9. Government termination and anti-defection laws in parliamentary democracies 10. Government Selection and Executive Powers: Constitutional Design in Parliamentary Democracies