The discussion on the phenomenology of life will continue to be crucial to the general outlook and direction of phenomenological investigations. The imp- tance of it is not only the fact that it is an innovation in the philosophical circle, but it is also an effort that contributes to the re-reading of the hitherto ex- gerated differences between phenomenology and metaphysics. What is new and signi?cant about life is that even though it is evident in the ?ow of the history of philosophy, no philosopher has seriously addressed it. Not many philosophers have said something in particular about life in serious philoso- ical re?ection. The discussion on life by Henri Bergson attests to this and one 3 can hardly point to other deep re?ections elsewhere about the subject. The advantage here about our area is not only that it has extended the horizon of phenomenological thinking, it has also helped to lead phenomenology from the constitutive analysis to a creative impetus that has brought a new point of view to the ?eld, hence raising questions about the general philosophical t- dition from ancient times. This is a reading which my philosophy attempts to investigate about Tymienieckan thought. The emphasis in philosophy till now has been more on reason in its int- lection and pure rational dimension based on the earliest conception of the human person distinguished by rationality.