Policy Competition and Policy Cooperation in a Monetary Union
Autor Michael Carlbergen Limba Engleză Hardback – 23 feb 2004
Toate formatele și edițiile | Preț | Express |
---|---|---|
Paperback (1) | 628.07 lei 6-8 săpt. | |
Springer Berlin, Heidelberg – aug 2012 | 628.07 lei 6-8 săpt. | |
Hardback (1) | 634.18 lei 6-8 săpt. | |
Springer Berlin, Heidelberg – 23 feb 2004 | 634.18 lei 6-8 săpt. |
Preț: 634.18 lei
Preț vechi: 746.09 lei
-15% Nou
Puncte Express: 951
Preț estimativ în valută:
121.39€ • 127.28$ • 100.30£
121.39€ • 127.28$ • 100.30£
Carte tipărită la comandă
Livrare economică 30 ianuarie-13 februarie 25
Preluare comenzi: 021 569.72.76
Specificații
ISBN-13: 9783540209140
ISBN-10: 354020914X
Pagini: 308
Ilustrații: XVI, 288 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 22 mm
Greutate: 0.61 kg
Ediția:2004
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
ISBN-10: 354020914X
Pagini: 308
Ilustrații: XVI, 288 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 22 mm
Greutate: 0.61 kg
Ediția:2004
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
1. Subject and Approach.- 2. The Monetary Union of Two Countries: Basic Models.- 3. The Monetary Union of Two Countries: Intermediate Models.- One. The Monetary Union of Two Countries: Basic Models.- 1. Monetary Policy in the Union.- 2. Fiscal Competition between Germany and France.- 3. Fiscal Cooperation between Germany and France.- 4. Competition between the Union Central Bank, the German Government, and the French Government.- 5. Cooperation between the Union Central Bank, the German Government, and the French Government.- 6. Independent Central Bank, Fiscal Cooperation between Germany and France.- 7. A Synopsis of the Basic Models.- Two. The Monetary Union of Two Countries: Intermediate Models.- 1. Fiscal Competition: A General Model.- 2. The Union Countries Differ in Size.- 3. The Union Countries Differ in Behaviour.- 4. Simultaneous and Independent Decisions.- 5. Gradualist Policies.- 6. Alternative Targets of the Union Central Bank.- 7. The German Government Targets Overemployment.- 8. No Spillovers of Fiscal Policy.- 9. Positive Spillovers of Fiscal Policy.- Three. The Monetary Union of Two Countries: Advanced Models.- 1. Cold-Turkey Policies: Sequential Decisions.- 2. Cold-Turkey Policies: Simultaneous Decisions.- 3. Gradualist Policies: Sequential Decisions.- 4. Gradualist Policies: Simultaneous Decisions.- 5. Monetary, Fiscal and Wage Competition.- Four. The Monetary Union of n Countries.- 1. The Monetary Union of Three Countries.- 2. The Monetary Union of Four Countries.- Five. Rational Policy Expectations.- 1. Rational Policy Expectations in Germany and France.- 2. Adaptive Policy Expectations in Germany and France.- 3. Adaptive Policy Expectations in Germany, Rational Policy Expectations in France.- Conclusion.- Result.- 1. Monetary Policy in the Union.- 2. Fiscal Competition between Germany and France.- 3. Fiscal Cooperation between Germany and France.- 4. Competition between the Union Central Bank, the German Government, and the French Government.- 5. Cooperation between the Union Central Bank, the German Government, and the French Government.- 6. Independent Central Bank, Fiscal Cooperation between Germany and France.- Symbols.- A Brief Survey of the Literature.- The Current Research Project.- References.
Caracteristici
Deep insights into the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies in the Euro area Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras