Power, Freedom, and Voting
Editat de Matthew Braham, Frank Steffenen Limba Engleză Paperback – 19 oct 2010
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9783642092428
ISBN-10: 364209242X
Pagini: 452
Ilustrații: XIV, 438 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 24 mm
Greutate: 0.63 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2008
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
ISBN-10: 364209242X
Pagini: 452
Ilustrații: XIV, 438 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 24 mm
Greutate: 0.63 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2008
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
Social Power and Social Causation: Towards a Formal Synthesis.- Power Indices Methodology: Decisiveness, Pivots, and Swings.- Further Reflections on the Expediency and Stability of Alliances.- Positional Power in Hierarchies.- A Public Help Index.- Shapley-Shubik vs. Strategic Power: Live from the UN Security Council.- Modified Power Indices for Indirect Voting.- Pivotal Voting Theory: The 1993 Clinton Health Care Reform Proposal in the U.S. Congress.- Coalition Formation Theories Revisited: An Empirical Investigation of Aumann’s Hypothesis.- Coalition Formation, Agenda Selection, and Power.- Democratic Defences and (De-)Stabilisations.- The Instability of Power Sharing.- The Power to Propose versus the Power to Oppose.- Divergence in the Spatial Stochastic Model of Voting.- Closeness Counts in Social Choice.- Freedom, Coercion, and Ability.- Guarantees in Game Forms.- Individual Control in Decision-Making and Attitudes Towards Inequality: The Case of Italy.- The Principle of Fairness: A Game Theoretic Model.- Power, Productivity, and Profits.- Trust, Responsibility, Power, and Social Capital.- Exploiting The Prince.
Caracteristici
Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras