Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government: The Lindahl Lectures
Autor Timothy Besleyen Limba Engleză Paperback – 23 aug 2007
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780199283910
ISBN-10: 0199283915
Pagini: 288
Ilustrații: numerous figures
Dimensiuni: 130 x 220 x 20 mm
Greutate: 0.36 kg
Editura: OUP OXFORD
Colecția OUP Oxford
Seria The Lindahl Lectures
Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom
ISBN-10: 0199283915
Pagini: 288
Ilustrații: numerous figures
Dimensiuni: 130 x 220 x 20 mm
Greutate: 0.36 kg
Editura: OUP OXFORD
Colecția OUP Oxford
Seria The Lindahl Lectures
Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom
Recenzii
Besley's book has great strengths and is recommended to all modern students of political economy.
Masterful...Principled Agents will be an essential resource for scholars
'How can democratic competition make a government of politicians act as a government for the people? Tim Besley has given us a broad and deep analysis of this fundamental agency problem which is essential to the theory of democracy. This is an important book for anyone who wants to study political science with the best analytical tools of modern economics.'
'How does the structure of democratic political institutions and organization shape policy choice? This path-breaking book boldly claims that well-designed institutions can help voters select politicians who are "better": more capable and more faithful to the fiduciary duties of public life. Novel in its emphasis on information, this unprecedentedly careful, thorough analysis of the "agency" problem links voters' ability to screen out bad politicians and discipline rent-seeking with the competence, motivation, and alignment of politicians' preferences to explain a wide variety of political economy and public finance outcomes including debt accumulation, the size and scope of government activities, corruption, and political turnover.'
'A wonderful and important book, that combines state of the art analysis and deep knowledge of real world institutions to obtain novel insights about a fundamental issue. It should be read by all those who want to understand what it is that brings about good government.'
'Tim Besley demonstrates how to analyze political agency in the intellectual middle ground left open in between the optimism of the traditional welfare-economics approach, and the pessimism of the traditional public-choice approach. The key to good government is institution design- in the best Federalist tradition- to improve incentives in policymaking and selection to public office. Quite simply, a great book by a great economist.'
Masterful...Principled Agents will be an essential resource for scholars
'How can democratic competition make a government of politicians act as a government for the people? Tim Besley has given us a broad and deep analysis of this fundamental agency problem which is essential to the theory of democracy. This is an important book for anyone who wants to study political science with the best analytical tools of modern economics.'
'How does the structure of democratic political institutions and organization shape policy choice? This path-breaking book boldly claims that well-designed institutions can help voters select politicians who are "better": more capable and more faithful to the fiduciary duties of public life. Novel in its emphasis on information, this unprecedentedly careful, thorough analysis of the "agency" problem links voters' ability to screen out bad politicians and discipline rent-seeking with the competence, motivation, and alignment of politicians' preferences to explain a wide variety of political economy and public finance outcomes including debt accumulation, the size and scope of government activities, corruption, and political turnover.'
'A wonderful and important book, that combines state of the art analysis and deep knowledge of real world institutions to obtain novel insights about a fundamental issue. It should be read by all those who want to understand what it is that brings about good government.'
'Tim Besley demonstrates how to analyze political agency in the intellectual middle ground left open in between the optimism of the traditional welfare-economics approach, and the pessimism of the traditional public-choice approach. The key to good government is institution design- in the best Federalist tradition- to improve incentives in policymaking and selection to public office. Quite simply, a great book by a great economist.'
Notă biografică
Timothy Besley is Professor of Economics at the LSE and Director of the Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) at the LSE. He is also a Research Fellow at the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). He has acted as Co-Editor of the American Economic Review and Managing Editor of the Economic Journal. He is an elected member of the Council of the Royal Economic Society, the Econometric Society, and the European Economics Association.