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Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity: Recent Economic Thought, cartea 35

Editat de James W. Friedman
en Limba Engleză Hardback – 31 dec 1993
Coordination is extremely important in economic, political, and social life. The concept of economic equilibrium is based on the coordination of producers and consumers in buying and selling. This book reviews the topic of coordination from an economic, theoretical standpoint. The aim of this volume is twofold: first, the book contributes to the ongoing research on the economics of coordination; and second, it disseminates results and encourages interest in the topic. The volume contains original research on coordination including general game-theoretic questions, particular coordination issues within specific fields of economics (i.e. industrial organization, international trade, and macroeconomics), and experimental research.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780792393818
ISBN-10: 0792393813
Pagini: 244
Ilustrații: X, 230 p.
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 x 19 mm
Greutate: 0.53 kg
Ediția:1994
Editura: SPRINGER NETHERLANDS
Colecția Springer
Seria Recent Economic Thought

Locul publicării:Dordrecht, Netherlands

Public țintă

Research

Cuprins

I Introduction.- 1 Introduction and Overview.- 2 A Review of Refinements, Equilibrium Selection, and Repeated Games.- 3 Coordination in Games: A Survey.- II General Issues in Coordination.- 4 Incorporating Behavioral Assumptions into Game Theory.- 5 On the Concepts of Strategy and Equilibrium in Discounted Repeated Games.- 6 The “Folk Theorem” for Repeated Games and Continuous Decision Rules.- 7 Alternative Institutions for Resolving Coordination Problems: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction and Preplay Communication.- III Coordination in Specific Economic Contexts.- 8 The Dynamics of Bandwagons.- 9 Dynamic Tariff Games with Imperfect Observability.- 10 Coordination Theory, The Stag Hunt, and Macroeconomics.- Author index.