Research in Law and Economics – A Journal of Policy: Research in Law and Economics
Autor Richard O. Zerbe Jr, John B. Kirkwooden Limba Engleză Hardback – 14 feb 2007
* Dennis Weisman models the price effects of mergers that not only increase concentration in the relevant market but also increase the merged firms' participation in other, complementary markets.
* Malcolm Coate and Mark Williams develop a superior method for calculating critical loss in markets that are relatively homogenous and competitive premerger.
* Zhiqi Chen surveys recent developments in economic theories of buyer power and creates a general framework for antitrust analysis.
* Thomas J. Miceli and Kathern Segerson, given the difficulty of collecting damages after a long latency period, examine the desirability of granting toxic exposure victims an independent cause of action for medical monitoring at the time of exposure. They shows that such a cause of action incarease incentives for injurer care but only at the cost of greater litigation cost. the reluctance of courts to adopt such a proposed cause of action reflects theri awareness of this trade-off.
*Each chapter examines in depth a topic in law and economics.
*Written by leading experts in the field.
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780762313488
ISBN-10: 076231348X
Pagini: 272
Ilustrații: Illustrated
Dimensiuni: 155 x 234 x 15 mm
Greutate: 0.53 kg
Editura: Emerald Publishing
Seria Research in Law and Economics
ISBN-10: 076231348X
Pagini: 272
Ilustrații: Illustrated
Dimensiuni: 155 x 234 x 15 mm
Greutate: 0.53 kg
Editura: Emerald Publishing
Seria Research in Law and Economics
Public țintă
* Researchers and academics in economics and businessCuprins
Lays vs. Wages: Contracting in The Klondike Gold Rush
Buyer Power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy
Generalized Critical Loss for Market Definition
Price-Fixing Overcharges: Legal and Economic Evidence
Predatory Price Cutting and Standard Oil: A Re-Examination of the Trial Record
On the optimal negligence standard in tort law when one party is a long-run and the other a short run player
Should Victims of Exposure to a Toxic Substance Have an Independent Claim for Medical Monitoring?
Market Concentration, Multi-Market Participation and Antitrust
Buyer Power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy
Generalized Critical Loss for Market Definition
Price-Fixing Overcharges: Legal and Economic Evidence
Predatory Price Cutting and Standard Oil: A Re-Examination of the Trial Record
On the optimal negligence standard in tort law when one party is a long-run and the other a short run player
Should Victims of Exposure to a Toxic Substance Have an Independent Claim for Medical Monitoring?
Market Concentration, Multi-Market Participation and Antitrust