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State, Anarchy, Collective Decisions: Some Applications of Game Theory to Political Economy

Autor A. Coram
en Limba Engleză Hardback – 4 mai 2001
State, Anarchy and Collective Decisions provides an introduction to the applications of game theory to a series of questions that are fundamental in political economy. These questions include: Why do we need states? What might happen without protection for life and property? How might tribes or criminal gangs behave in struggles over material possessions? Would people tell the truth if asked what they wanted?
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780333779323
ISBN-10: 0333779320
Pagini: 192
Ilustrații: XIII, 176 p.
Dimensiuni: 140 x 216 x 18 mm
Greutate: 0.4 kg
Ediția:2001
Editura: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Colecția Palgrave Macmillan
Locul publicării:London, United Kingdom

Cuprins

Preface Acknowledgements State, Anarchy and Game Theory Security in the Hobbesian State of Nature and Related Non-cooperative Games Security and Material Possessions in the Lockean State of Nature: Non-cooperative Games Material Production and Property Rules with Stealing Production and Guarding : Non-cooperative Games Problems of Reputation and Markets for Protection: Non-cooperative Game Theory Evolutionary Stable Strategies Collective Decisions and the Core: Cooperative Games Welfare and the Strategies of Preference Revelation Voting Rules and Strategic Manipulation Index

Notă biografică

ALEX CORAM is currently an associate professor at the University of Western Australia. Among the subjects on which he has published are international capital transfers, predictability in history, luck, and stability and voting. He has published in such journals as the British Journal of Political Science, Social Science Quarterly, Political Studies and Economic Letters.