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The Concept of Mind

Autor Gilbert Ryle
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 11 mai 2023
First published in 1949, Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind is one of the classics of twentieth-century philosophy. Described by Ryle as a ‘sustained piece of analytical hatchet-work’ on Cartesian dualism, The Concept of Mind is a radical and controversial attempt to jettison once and for all what Ryle called ‘the ghost in the machine’: Descartes’ argument that mind and body are two separate entities. This sixtieth anniversary edition includes a substantial commentary by Julia Tanney and is essential reading for new readers interested not only in the history of analytic philosophy but in its power to challenge major currents in philosophy of mind and language today.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9781774645215
ISBN-10: 1774645211
Pagini: 318
Dimensiuni: 154 x 223 x 22 mm
Greutate: 0.47 kg
Editura: Must Have Books

Notă biografică

Gilbert Ryle was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at the University of Oxford between 1945 and 1968 and editor of 'Mind' from 1947 to 1971. He died in 1976.

Eminent philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel C. Dennett is the authorof Darwin's Dangerous Idea.

Descriere

Descriere de la o altă ediție sau format:
Lets us re-examine many cherished ideas about knowledge, imagination, consciousness and the intellect. This book features a classic example of philosophy.

Cuprins

Introduction
I. Descartes' Myth
1. The Official Doctrine
2. The Absurdity of the Official Doctrine
3. The Origin of the Category Mistake
4. Historical Note
II. Knowing How and Knowing That
1. Foreword
2. Intelligence and Intellect
3. Knowing How and Knowing That
4. The Motives of the Intellectualist Legend
5. 'In My Head'
6. The Positive Account of Knowing How
7. Intelligent Capacities versus Habits
8. The Exercise of Intelligence
9. Understanding and Misunderstanding
10. Solipsism
III. The Will
1. Foreword
2. The Myth of Volitions
3. The Distinction Between Voluntary and Involuntary
4. Freedom of the Will
5. The Bogy of Mechanism
IV. Emotion
1. Foreword
2. Feelings versus Inclinations
3. Inclinations versus Agitations
4. Moods
5. Agitations and Feelings
6. Enjoying and Wanting
7. The Criteria of Motives
8. The Reasons and Causes of Actions
9. Conclusion
V. Dispositions and Occurrences
1. Foreword
2. The Logic of Dispositional Statements
3. Mental Capacities and Tendencies
4. Mental Occurrences
5. Achievements
VI. Self-Knowledge
1. Foreword
2. Consciousness
3. Introspection
4. Self-Knowledge Without Privileged Access
5. Disclosure by Unstudied Talk
6. The Self
7. The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I'
VII. Sensation and Observation
1. Foreword
2. Sensations
3. The Sense Datum Theory
4. Sensation and Observation
5. Phenomenalism
6. Afterthoughts
VIII. Imagination
1. Foreword
2. Picturing and Seeing
3. The Theory of Special Status Pictures
4. Imagining
5. Pretending
6. Pretending, Fancying and Imagining
7. Memory
IX. The Intellect
1. Foreword
2. The Demarcation of the Intellect
3. The Construction, Possession and Utilisation of Theories
4. The Application and Misapplication of Epistemological Terms
5. Saying and Teaching
6. the Primacy of the Intellect
7. Epistemology
X. Psychology
1. The Programme of Psychology
2. Behaviourism
Index

Recenzii

'This new edition of Ryle’s classic work, with a substantial critical study by Julia Tanney, will make possible a re-assessment of Ryle and of the revolutionary potential of The Concept of Mind. Tanney’s treatment of Ryle is complex and subtle, and opens up important new ways of thinking in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language.' - Cora Diamond, University of Virginia, USA