The Illusion Of Deterrence: The Roosevelt Presidency And The Origins Of The Pacific War
Autor Abraham Ben-zvien Limba Engleză Paperback – 31 mai 2021
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780367308421
ISBN-10: 0367308428
Pagini: 136
Dimensiuni: 152 x 232 mm
Greutate: 0.21 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: Taylor & Francis
Colecția Routledge
Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom
ISBN-10: 0367308428
Pagini: 136
Dimensiuni: 152 x 232 mm
Greutate: 0.21 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: Taylor & Francis
Colecția Routledge
Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom
Cuprins
Introduction: A Theoretical Framework -- The Policy Makers: A Bureaucratic Perspective -- Walsh, Drought, and Ickes: Two Conceptual Extremes -- Stimson, Morgenthau, and Hornbeck: The Global Approach -- Stimson, Morgenthau, Hornbeck, and the Military -- President Roosevelt and Ambassador Grew: The Pragmatic Approach -- Cordell Hull: The Idealistic Approach -- Synthesis and Conclusion: The Worldview, the Image, and the Shaping of American Policy Toward Japan
Notă biografică
BRAHAM BEN-ZVI is professor in the Department of Political Science and a research fellow at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University. In addition, Professor Ben-Zvi will become, in October 1998, the head of the Morris E. Ruriel Center for International Studies, Tel Aviv University. He is author of The Illusion of Deterrence: The Roosevelt Presidency and the Origins of the Pacific War and The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship (Columbia).
Descriere
The aim of this book is to specifically, expose the conceptual origins of the American failure to deter Japan, to a higher level of understanding regarding the general limits of deterrence and of coercive diplomacy will be achieved.